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Transmissions of Music on the Internet:
An Analysis of the Copyright Laws of
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States
Daniel J. Gervais*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the status of copyright laws in several
countriesas they pertainto transmissionsof music on the Internet.
Because the exact legal ramificationsof music transmissionsover
the Internet are currently unclear,the Author compares copyright
laws of six major markets and examines the potentialapplication
of the copyright laws and other rights that may apply. The Article
also discusses rules concerning which transbordertransmissions
are likely to be covered by a country's national laws, as well as
specific rules applying to the liability of intermediaries. Next, the
Article summarizes the comparative findings and discusses the
relevant nuances that exist among the countries covered. Finally,
the Article applies its findings to several real-life examples and
detailsthepracticalimpact of currentandfuture copyright laws on
the varying factpatterns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With or without Napster, access to music on the Internet is
unavoidable and is likely to become one of the main modes of
commercialization of music.' In fact, copyright is at a crossroads; it
must adapt to the increasing demand for legitimate online access to
protected works, especially music, but also materials used for research
and distance education, in particular scientific texts. Otherwise, peer-topeer technology and other forms of online transmission and exchange
may sound the death knell of copyright as we know it. 2 The answer vll
depend in large part on how fast the so-called "content industries" are
able to provide business models in tune with the demands of the various
user communities.3 Chances are, copyright will survive. The way in
which it is used and administered, however, will need to change. The
traditional exclusive rights that prohibit use of protected material seem
almost impossible to apply in the Internet age. The exclusive right
paradigm is gradually being replaced by a compensation paradigm and
the focus is shifting from preventing unauthorized uses to getting paid
for "authorized"--and unavoidable-uses. 4 The copyright "concept" is
still the best basis to claim financial compensation and organize markets
along these lines, two essential tools for most creators, publishers, and
producers.
It is highly probable that in a few years radio and television
receivers will be permanently connected to the Internet and listeners
will be able to pick individual songs from an almost endless catalogue,
preselect songs, and program music for special occasions. 5 The extent to
which listeners will make temporary or permanent copies of the music
on a computer or computer-like device is unclear. Will it make sense to
have a permanent, stored copy of music? On a portable player, the
answer is probably yes. 6 Will computers with several gigabytes of
memory be used to transfer existing collections of compact discs onto a
single server? For the operators of broadcasting stations, this type of

1.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILE.LIA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INTHE INFORMATION AGE 76-87 (2000) [hereinafter THE DIGITAL DILE, , ,m.
2.
See id.; see also Michael D. Crawford, Modern Technology and the Death of
Copyright, at http-flwww.goingware.comflcomments/2000feb/05top.html (Feb. 5. 2000). cxe
generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of CopyrighL Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001).
3.
THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 79.
4.
See id. at 230. See also LESLEY ELLEN HARRIS, DIGITAL PROPERTY 77 (1998).
5.
THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 78.
6.
See Mini Disc Frequently Asked Questions, at http/iv.%,,,.midisc.org/
minidiscjfaq.html (Oct. 4, 2001). If music is not stored on a portable player, it would have
to be streamed using technology such as WAP. See, e.g., the Nokia Music Player known as
HDR-1 at httpJ/www.nokia.com/main.html (Oct. 4, 2001).
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storage clearly makes sense. 7 Its use and value inside the home is less
clear. In other words, the exact business models are still emerging and
being formed by old and new players. What is clear, however, is that,
sooner or later, the exact legal ramifications of music transmissions on
the Internet will need to be clarified.
While some answers are emerging at the national level, it is
necessary to understand the legal process in other countries and
certainly of all major markets for at least two reasons. First, music
transmissions across borders-and several transactions related
thereto-may involve more than one set of national laws.8 Second, if and
when international rules are negotiated to deal with this new
phenomenon, a better understanding of the differences between national
laws will undoubtedly help to bridge existing differences.
This Article will look at the copyright laws of six major markets,
and the applicable "directives" of the European Union. For each country,
the Article will examine the potential application of the primary
copyright rights, in particular the right of reproduction and the right of
communication to the public or public performance, but also other rights
that may apply to musical works. The Article will also discuss rules
concerning which transborder transmissions are likely to be governed by
a country's national laws and any specific rules applying to the liability
of intermediaries. Finally, the Article will summarize the comparative
findings and apply them to a series of real-life examples. The Article
does not deal with the so-called neighboring rights or distinct rights in
sound recordings as such.

7.
See, e.g., Mark Plotkin, The Times They Are a Changin' Internet? MP3?
Digital? How Technology has Forced the Law to Deal with a New Era in Music
Distribution, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 46 (1999); June Chung, Note, The Digital
PerformanceRight in Sound RecordingsAct and its Failureto Address the Issue of Digital
Music's New Form of Distribution, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1361 (1997); Frank Saxe, Radio,
Record Labels Chafe Over Streaming,BILLBOARD, May 26, 2001 at 1; View From the Top,
PC MAG., Sept. 4, 2001, at 175 (interview with Scott McNealy); Kevin Libin, Are We
Having Fun Yet?, CANADIAN BUS., May 28, 2001, at 22.
8.
Marc E. Mayer, Do InternationalInternet Sound Recording Infringements
Implicate U.S. Copyright Law?, 15 No. 5 CLW 11 (1998); Silvio Waisbord, When the Cart of
Media is Before the Horse of Identity, in 25(4) COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 377-98 (1998).
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ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

A. Canada
Analysis of the legal situation in Canada focuses on a recent
decision by the Canadian Copyright Board 9 that answers several

questions concerning Internet transmissions of music. In the absence of
decisions by Canadian courts and in light of the fact that by and large

the Board's decision seems consonant with Canadian copyright law
principles, it constitutes a good indication of the current state of

Canadian law on this subject. In this decision, the Board was called on
to decide whether a music transmission on the Internet is a
telecommunication subject to the tariffs and jurisdiction of Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers of Music of Canada (SOCAN),10 the
single collective that manages performing rights in Canada. In other
words, the Board had to decide whether SOCAN could collect a royalty
for performances of music by telecommunication on the Internet. In
addition, if the so-called "Tariff 22" applied, the Board had to determine
who would be responsible for the payment of royalties. The Board's
decision is only a "Phase I decision" on legal issues." The Board has not
issued the tariff itself, which will be Phase H of the process, and is
unlikely to move forward until the appeal of the Board's decision before
the Federal Court of Canada-by both parties-is settled or a final
decision rendered.
1. The Right of Reproduction
In paragraph 1(a) of section 3 of the Canadian Copyright Act, 12 the
copyright owner is granted a right of reproduction in any material form,
which includes reproductions in digital form. A reproduction occurs, for
example, when a phonogram is converted in a specific digital format to

9.
Canadian Copyright Board, Re Statement of Royalties to be Collected for the
Performance or the Communication by Telecommunication of Musical or Drainatico--

Musical Works, 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 (1999).
10.
See SOCAN, Do You Need a License?, at http://vvlw.socan.catentmusicusersl
weblicensing.asp (Dec. 2000) (explaining licensing requirements for web use of musical
works); see also Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, Decision 'Tariff 22"of the CanadianCopyright
Board & Internet Law Related Issues, at http:Jhwwnv.robic.ca/publicationri244-01.htm;
Gregory C. Ludlow & Mark Le Blanc, Survey ofIntellectualPropertyPart V-Copyright &

IndustrialDesigns, 31 OTAWA L. REV. 93, 156 (199912000).
11.
Moyse, supra note 10, at 2.
12.
Canadian Copyright Act, &S.C., ch. C-42 (1985). as amended, atailableat
httpJllois.ustice.gc.ca/en/C-42/33333.html.
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be transmittable via Internet. 13 A second reproduction takes place when
the work is copied onto a server. 14 The user who requests the musical
work from a website makes a third copy. 15 The first two clearly need to
be authorized. Does the third copy-made by the user-also need to be
licensed? There is no clear answer to this question, and the Copyright
Board did not answer it as such. In a separate decision, however, the
Board approved a levy on blank media that covers digital media and
does seem precisely to compensate for end-user copying. 1 6 Interestingly,
technology is being developed-such as SDMI-to prevent such
copying. 17 Clearly, however, the question whether a user can make or
send additional copies is different from the questions surrounding the
original transmission.
The copy legally downloaded by a user would probably be considered
licensed, at least implicitly or on the basis of a mouse-click contract. 18
Because there is no "fair use" under Canadian law, further use made by
the user of the downloaded copy would either need to be licensed or be
considered "fair dealing" under section 21 or 30 of the Copyright Act. 19
The concept of "fair dealing" in Canadian law comprises a series of
specific exceptions to the exclusive right of the author, including
research, private study, criticism or review-provided the source author
and other rightsholders are acknowledged-news reporting, as well as
various exceptions concerning educational institutions, libraries,
20
archives, and museums.
There is, however, a specific exception for private use of recorded
music. Section 80(1) allows the reproduction for private use of a musical
work embodied in a sound recording and performers' performance. This
exception does not apply if the reproduction is for the purpose of selling,
renting, offering for sale or rental, distributing-whether or not for the
purpose of trade--communicating to the public by telecommunication, or
publicly performing the musical work. 2 1 It is this kind of private copying

13.
Eric S. Slater, Broadcastingon the Internet: Legal Issuesfor Traditionaland
Internet-Only Broadcasters,6 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 25, 34, 41 (1997).
14.
Id. at 34.
15.
Id. at 35.
16.
Tariff of levies to be collected by CPCCin 2001 and 2002 for the sale of blank
audio recordingmedia in Canada,Decision by the Copyright Board of Canada (Dec. 15,
2000), at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c2201200lreasons-b.pdf [hereinafter Dec. 15,
2000, Decision]; Re Statement of Royalties, supra note 9, at 417.
17.
THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 83.
18.
Dec. 15, 2000, Decision, supra note 16, at 6 (characterizing music downloaded
by internet users for a fee as "legitimate").
19.

See JOHN S. McKEoWN, CANADIAN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND INDUSTRIAL

DESIGNS 549 (3d ed.2000); NORMAND TAMARO, THE 2001 COPYRIGHTACT ANNOTATED 416
(2001).
20.

MCKEOWN, supra note 19, at 549. See also TAMARO, supra note 19, at 416.

21.
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 82 (1985), as amended, reprintedin TAMARO,
supra note 19, at 675.
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that is intended to be compensated by the levy recently decided by the
Copyright Board, pursuant to section 82 of the Copyright Act.
2. The Right of Communication
In its decision, the Copyright Board first had to determine whether
a transmission through the Internet is a communication. It concluded
that transmitting musical works to someone via the Internet was in fact
a communication of the information.22 According to the Board, the fact
that the work is not transmitted in a sole component but in many
elements or packets does not influence the concepts of communication
and reproduction under copyright. This is only a consequence of the
technology used. Even if the work is not contained in a single file, the
Board concluded that a reproduction of the work occurs because the
work can be reconstituted: "While some intermediaries may not be
transmitting the entire work or a substantial part of a work, all of the
packets required to communicate the work are transmitted from the
server on which the work is located to the end user. Consequently, the
work is communicated." 23
To be covered under the Canadian Copyright Act, the
communication has to be done by telecommunication. 24 Section 2 of the
Act describes telecommunication as any "transmission of signs, signals,
writing, images or sounds or intelligence of any nature by Nvire, radio,
visual, optical or other electromagnetic system."2- The conclusion at
which the Board arrives is that packets of information transmitted on
the Internet meet that definition. Consequently, a musical work
26
transmitted via Internet is a communication by telecommunication.
To be covered, a communication by telecommunication must also be
public. 27 A communication is public "when it is made to individual
members ofthe public at different times, whether chosen by them.. .or by

22.

The Court reasoned as follows:

Opponents of Tariff 22 state that the process of compression and decompression
means that something other than a musical work is transmitted. Yet, the result of
these operations is that information is provided that allows a lay recipient to
recognize the work. That, in itself, is sufficient. If such operations, or others such
as modulation or encoding, could somehow change the nature of what is being
communicated, then it would be impossible to communicate a musical work
through a digital transmission. This would result in the rather absurd situation
that commercial radio stations would no longer need to pay royalties to SOCAN as
soon as they switched to digital technology.
Re Statement of Royalties, supra note 9, at 446 (citations omitted).
23.
1& at 447.
24.
Id. at 423-24.
25.
Id at 443-44.
26.
Id at 4 4 3.
27.
Id- at 444.
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the person responsible for sending the work ....
,,28 A communication is
not private because it is received by subscribers in their private homes.
Under previous Canadian court decisions, communications intended to
be received by the general public in private homes were considered
public. 2 9 Although the communication is intended for a particular
public, it similarly remains public. A work is thus made available to the
public when it is posted on a website and could be requested by a user.
The Board also decided that information is communicated whether
or not the emission and the reception take place simultaneously:
'Musical works are made available on the Internet openly and without
concealment, with the knowledge and intent that they be conveyed to all
who might access the Internet. Accordingly, a communication may be to
the public when it is made to individual members of the public at
' 30
different times.
Indeed, timing is not relevant; nowhere in the Canadian law does
one find a requirement that a communication be simultaneous. 31 The
Board also concluded that using compression techniques
did not affect
32
the copyright status of the telecommunication.
3. Canadian Transmissions
Once it had established that a transmission of music on the Internet
was a public communication, the Board had to determine when and
where the communication occurs. The communication of a musical work
occurs when the latter is transmitted, not when it is made available to
the public. 33 In other words, the musical work will be communicated to
the public when it is requested.3 4 A public communication happens each
time a user accesses the work on a computer system. Even if just one

28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. Whether the rightsholder can retain control on the Internet, given the
geographic scope and sheer number of users, is an open question. C.f. Bishop v. Stevens:
"A composer who authorizes performances of his work for a period of time has not
irrevocably given up control over how the work is presented to the public. He may choose
at a future time to withdraw his authorization .... He may control the frequency of
performance, and choose the audiences which are to hear his work. Other performers
might copy his performances without authorization, but thepublic natureofperformance is
such that this will likely come to his attention." Bishop v. Stevens, [19901 2 S.C.R. 467, 479
(McLachlin, J.) (emphasis added). For a similar view of the "power" of the author's
exclusive right in the United States, see Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
31.
For a requirement which applies to retransmissions, see CanadianCopyright
Act, R.S.C., Ch. C-42, § 31(2) as amended, available at http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/C42/3333.html (exempting from liability acts of simultaneous retransmission of both local
and distant signals, and requiring, in the case of distant signals, that applicable royalties
be paid).
32.
Re Statement of Royalties, supra note 9,at 447.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 449.
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communication occurs, it is still a communication to the public.5
Finally, the communication occurs at the time the work is transmittedwhether it is played at the point of reception or not.3 6 The
communication is authorized when the work is made available on a
website, and consequently that act must be authorized or licensed. 37
The law requires that the communication take place "in Canada" to
be covered by the exclusive right contained in the Canadian Copyright
Act. 38 It seems that a communication occurs "in Canada" when it comes
from a server located in Canada. In 1994, the Canadian Supreme Court
decided in the CAB 199439 case that a communication occurs where the
transmission originated. Thus, the authorization for the public
communication is essential only when the work is posted on a Canadian
server. The result is the same whether the content is on the original site
or on a mirror site. That being said, in the Tariff 22 decision the Board
explicitly left open the following question whether "an entity that
provides content outside Canada with the intention to communicate it
specifically to recipients in Canada is communicating in Canada?" 40 In
other words, it would not be the location of the server that would
determine jurisdiction, but rather the intent of the provider. If this
position were confirmed, the Board would thus find itself trying to assert
jurisdiction over a site located in the United States but whose primary
market was Canada. This poses a number of interesting conflict of laws
and enforcement questions. Because the Board would seem ready to give
Canadian collectives the right to clear all transmissions from Canada,
however, would that apply to a server located in Canada whose primary
market was the United States? Naturally, independently of the answer
under Canadian law, U.S. law might then apply, as in the recent
41
"iCraveTV" example.

35.
Id. at 449-50 ("As was stated earlier, a communication is to the public if its
intended target is a public. The degree to which the person wishing to communicate the

work succeeds in doing so is irrelevant.").
36.
Id. at 450 ("Third, the communication occurs at the time the work is
transmitted whether or not it is played or viewed upon receipt, is stored for use at a later
date or is never used at all.").
37.
Id. at 455. See also Federal Partners in Technology Transfer, Presentationat
the CurrentPracticesand Issues in Managing & Exploiting Intellectual Property (Oct. 5,
2001), at http-//nrc.cacorporateenglishrmdex.html; Amy-Lynne Williams of the law firm of

Deeth Williams Wall, InformationTechnology Law in Canada,WORLD LEGAL FORUI (Dec.
1, 1999), at http-ilwwv.worldlegalforum.co.uldcanada articles19991201921.html; GLEN
BLOOM AND DIANE CORNISH,

MUSIC ON THE INTERNET - LIABILITY UNDER SOCAN's

TARIFF 22 DETERMINED (1999).
38.
See Re Statement of Royalties, supra note 9, at 420.
39.
Id. at 459 (stating the rule in CAB 1994 case).
Id. at 460.
40.
41.
Twentieth Century Fox v. iCraveTV, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11670 (W.D. Pa.
2000); William Crane, The World-WideJurisdiction:An Analysis of Over.Incluswe Internet
JurisdictionalLaw and An Attempt by Congress to Fix It, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & &,T.

L. & POLY 267, 287-88 (2001).
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The situation may change when Canada implements the 1996
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty
42
(WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).
An expanded right of communication to the public-also referred to as
the "making available" right-is contained in these two new
instruments. 43 The European Union seems to have interpreted this
right in such a way that a protected work or object is made available in
every country from which it can be accessed. 4 4 The practical
implications of this interpretation are discussed in Part III below.
As far as the risk of servers located in so-called copyright havens is
concerned, part of the solution resides in establishing a proper notice
and take down procedure, as in the U.S. Digital Millenium Copyright
Act. 45 In light of the Board's comments on foreign servers commercially
aimed at Canadian users, however, a modified Bogsch theory might
apply. According to this "theory" enunciated by the former DirectorGeneral of the WIPO, Dr. Arpad Bogsch, in the context of satellite
transmissions, 46 the emission theory should apply provided the laws of
the countries of emission and reception are similar or comparable. If the
country of emission has no acceptable copyright legislation, then the
laws of the country of reception will apply to the transmission. This
Article will return to this question in Part III below.
4. Liability Issues
The Copyright Board also had to establish who is the communicator.
It is obvious that the person who makes the work available is
responsible for the communication. A person who just provides means of

42.
See A Framework for Copyright Reform, paper published by the Canadian
government on June 25, 2001, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/ssg/rpO1101e.htinl.
43.
Neither of which is in force at this time owing to an insufficient number of
ratifications. Entry into force, however, is likely at the end of 2001 or early in 2002. The
right to make available is contained in Article 8 of the WCT and Articles 10 and 14 of the
WPPT. Article 8 WCT reads (in part) as follows:
[A]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way

that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, art. 8, reprinted in Goldstein, infra note 58, at 423.
44.
See infra Part III of this Article.
45.
17 U.S.C. § 1201-05 (2001).
46.
This view was expressed orally during meetings of committees of experts
meeting under the auspices of WIPO. See Mario Fabiani, Broadcast Transmissions Via
Satellite or Cable and Copyright, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLDWIDE
FORUM ON THE IMPACT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY 160 (1988).
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telecommunication does not communicate it to the public. 47 According to
the Board:
Content providers do not provide tools for the use to occur: they provide
the work. They dictate content.... They determine whether the site will
contain musical works. They select those works, protected or unprotected.
They know and expect that the materials they post will serve to effect a
use which is protected if the work is not in the public domain, something
which it is incumbent upon them to verify: their contractual arrangements
with the person whose services they retain to ensure transmission of the
work clearly contemplate that the sole use of the posted content isto be
the production of audible and visual messages on the recipient's hardware.
In fact, once posted, the music, assuming it is protected, cannot be u~ed
48
without infringing copyright.

One may question whether there may be cases in which using music
posted on the Web would not violate copyright, for example, if a
legitimate exception applied. 49 The Board seems to be correct, however,
in concluding that content providers have the lion's share of the
responsibility-when compared with service or access providers.
The Board decision has now been appealed directly to the Federal
Court of Appeal and a decision is expected towards the end of 2001. It
may then be appealed to the Supreme Court.50 In the meantime,
another tariff has been filed for approval by the "mechanical rights"
societies, arguing that a mechanical reproduction takes place in any
Internet transmission of a sound recording, because, at the very least, a
copy of the work is made in the digital transmission itself.
B. France
As for other EU countries covered, this Article directs the reader's
attention to Part HI on the European copyright and e-commerce
directives, which, when fully implemented, will impact the law and
practice of EU Member States.
1. The Right of Reproduction
Under French law, the right of reproduction is involved in most, if
not all, Internet transmissions of protected works.5 1 The reproduction
right is contained in Article L.122-3 of the French Intellectual Property
Code.5 2 A single reproduction is sufficient to constitute a reproduction

47.
Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C., Ch. C-42, § 2.4(I)b (1985).
48.
Re Statement of Royalties, supra note 9, at 457.
49.
See Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. C-42, § 32.2 (1985).
50.
Supreme Court Act, R-S.C., ch. S-26, § 40(l) (1993) (Can.).
51.
See, eg., Sardou case, bfra note 53.
52.
Article L.122-3 of the French Intellectual Property Code, araslable at
clea.wipo.int:
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requiring an authorization. For example, in the Sardou case 5 3 the
Tribunal de Grande Instance (High Court) of Paris affirmed that the
posting of a work on a server-to communicate it through the Internetwas such a reproduction. The Tribunal also stated that the digitization
of a work was a reproduction that had to be authorized by the copyright
owner. 54 Thus, posting a musical work on a commercial server is a
reproduction requiring an authorization. In the same vein, a
reproduction occurs when the service provider copies the work onto a
hard disk or other digital storage medium. In the Brel case, the Court
found that students had infringed the reproduction right in reproducing
musical works on their web pages. 55
The storage of a protected work in a computer memory is also
considered a reproduction. When the recipients of transmissions from a
website download a file on their computers, they reproduce the work. Is
that reproduction made for "private use?" Or does it benefit from an
exemption? The exception relating to copies for private use is contained
in Article L. 122-5-2 of the Intellectual Property Code. 56 A copy made by
the recipient of a commercial web transmission of music in most cases
cannot claim the benefit of the exemption for private use, owing to the
commercial nature of the transaction. Indeed, copying the work on a
hard disk or CD-ROM is similar-in some respects-to buying a CD in a
store. This analysis by the Court of the potential impact on the market
for the music-a criterion not found in the French Code-is strikingly
similar to the fourth fair use criteria in U.S. law. 57 In the Sardou case,
the Court thus concluded that the storage by a user of a work on his
personal computer connected to Internet was a reproduction requiring
an authorization.5 8

Reproduction shall consist in the physical fixation of a work by any process
permitting it to be communicated to the public in an indirect way. It may be

carried out, in particular, by printing, drawing, engraving, photography, casting
and all processes of the graphical and plastic arts, mechanical, cinematographic or
magnetic recording. In the case of works of architecture, reproduction shall also
consist in the repeated execution of a plan or of a standard project.
53.
See ART Music France and Warner Chappel France v. Etcole Nationale
Sup6rieure des T6lcommunications et al., T.G.I. Paris, Aug. 14, 1996, D. Jur. 490

[hereinafter Sardou case].
54.
Id.
55.
See Brel case, infra note 62.
56.
Copies or reproductions reserved strictly for the private use of the copier and
not intended for collective use, with the exception of copies of works of art to be used for
purposes identical with those for which the original work was created and copies of
software other than backup copies made in accordance with paragraph II of Article L. 1226-1, French Intellectual Property Code.
57.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); see also Part II.F of this paper dealing with U.S. law.
58.
See Sardou case, supra note 53.
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2. The Right of Representation
An Internet transmission in France is also linked to the right of
"representation." This notion is defined at the Article L.122-2 of the
French Intellectual Property Code. 59 A representation is a
communication of a work to the public by any means and communication
by Internet is included in the concept of "telediffusion," which in turn is
a representation of a diffusion by any means. 60 To be protected under
the law, this communication must be public-beyond the family circle
61
and social acquaintances.
Users who access a protected work on the Internet at the moment
and the place they choose are part of the public. Hence, when people
post works on a website, they communicate to the public. In the Brel
case, 62 a French court confirmed this view. Two students who had
posted musical works on their personal web pages were sued for
infringement to both the right of reproduction and the right of
representation. Concerning the representation right specifically, the
Court concluded that, although the musical works were posted on a
"personal" web page, the students had infringed the copyright owner's
exclusive right because, by posting information on the Internet, they
63
intended to make it available to the public.
Making music available on the Internet thus requires a specific
license for the representation of the musical works. Section L. 122-7 of
the Code provides that when a total license is given concerning the
representation right or the reproduction right, the extension of this
license is limited to the technology intended in the contract. Currently,
licenses are granted by collecting societies. 64 This seems to be imposed
by law when the author has assigned over his rights to a collective.6 5

59.

PAUL GOLDSTEIN,

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT.

PRINCIPLES.

LAW.

AND

PRACTICE 267 (2001).
60.
Defined as follows in the French Code: "Performance shall consist inthe
communication of the work to the public by any process whatsoever, particularly: (...)
Telediffusion: Telediffusion shall mean distribution by any telecommunication process of

sounds, images, documents, data and messages of any kind. Transmission of a work
towards a satellite shall be assimilated to a performance." Art. L.122-2 of the Code.
61.
See Art. L.122-5(i) of the Code.
62.

tditions musicales Pouchenel, Warner Chappel France, MCA CaraveUe v.

Ecole Centrale de Paris (ECP), Jean-Philippe IL,Guillaume V., and tcole Nationale
Supdrieure des T6ldcommunications (ENST), Ulrich F., Frangois.Xavier B., T.G.I. Paris,
Aug. 14, 1996, JCP, Ed. G 1122 7 27 (1996) [hereinafter Brel case].
63.
See id.
64.
See Title H,Book III of the French Code.
65.
The publication of a work implies assignment of the right of reprographic
reproduction to a society governed by Title II of Book IIof the Code and approved to such
end by the Minister responsible for Culture. Art. L.122-10.
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3. French Transmissions
French courts have not indicated how they would apply private
international law rules to online music transmissions. The principle,
however, is that the law of the country in which the protection is claimed
will apply. 66 It is not necessarily the lex fori, but rather the lex loci
delicti. Courts will likely assert jurisdiction not only over transmissions
from France, but also transmissions into France that are alleged to
cause damage. 67 Courts recently applied French law to online auctions,
68
but were careful to issue an order limited to the territory of France.
4. Liability Issues
Having determined that an Internet transmission seems to involve
both a reproduction and a representation, it is necessary to define who is
responsible for the-restricted-acts involving those rights. French
courts have provided some clues about the liability of the various actors
involved. It seems that the service provider could be liable for copyright
infringement if it does not take some reasonable action to prevent
restricted acts. Case law is not uniform on this point and could change
as a result of the implementation of the European Union Copyright
69
Directive.
Under French law, the "director" of the publication of an
audiovisual communication may have an obligation of "monitoring and
diligence." Although a website is considered an audiovisual work,
according to the Infonie case of September 28, 1999, the service provider
would not be liable as a "director of publication. ' 70 The court concluded
that "the director of an audiovisual communication service is the one
who can monitor before the publication and who has the control on the

66.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, at 65.
67.
See A. AND H. J. LUCAS, TRAITE DE LA PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE ETARTISTIQUE
§§ 986-91 (2d ed. 2000).

68.

See

France

Bans

Internet

Nazi

Auctions,

BBC

NEws,

at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_760000/760782.stm (May 23, 2000)
(summarizing the court's interim decision); see also Michelle Dennehy, French Court:

Yahoo Must Block Access, AUCTION WATCH, at http://www.auctionwatch.com/awdaily/
dailynews/novemberO0/2-112000.html (Nov. 20, 2000) (summarizing the decision on the
merits); Kristi Essick, Yahoo Told to Block Nazi Goods From French, THE INDUSTRY
STANDARD
(Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://www.thestandard.comlarticle/
0,1902,20320,00.html.
69.
See infra Part III; see also A.C.I. and A.C.V. v. Christophe M., M. Christophe
S., Soci6tk Infonie, T.G.I. Puteaux, Sept. 28, 1999; L. Lacoste v. Multimania France SPPI,
Esterel, T.G.I. Nanterre, Ire, Dec. 8, 1999, D.S. Jur. Somm. 274; inf. C.A. Versailles, June
8, 2000, D.S. Jur. I.R. 270.
70.
See id.
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content."71 Usually, the service provider-in that capacity-has no
control on the content posted on its server. The court thus exempted the
provider from any liability and concluded that it was the person who
provided the content who was responsible for the infringement. 2
In a decision rendered in December 1999 involving a similar set of
facts, another court found a service provider liable. French top model
Lynda Lacoste sued the creators of a website as well as the service
provider for breach of her right to image-considered a personality right
under French law. 73 The website contained several pictures of Lacoste
without her authorization. Even though she had given her authorization
for the publication of these pictures, she had not granted the right to use
them on the Internet. The court first distinguished between the role of
service provider, administrator of the server-webmaster-, and access
provider.74 The latter had no liability; his role was to transfer bytes,
without control over the content. The former, on the other hand, had a
larger role to play with the content posted on its server; it provided
permanent storage for the information and made it available to anyone.
The court also noted that the "service provider had the possibility to
access and check the content" posted on its server. 7 Accordingly, the
Court found that service providers have a general obligation of
"diligence," which forces them to take measures to prevent prejudice to
third parties and control the legality of the content traded over their
network. 76 This is similar to the Yahoo! case involving auctions of Nazi
paraphernalia in France. 7 7 The "obligation of diligence" does not,
however, require that service providers monitor all content posted on
their servers. They must take "reasonable measures"-based on
reasonable industry practice-to block sites when the illicit nature of the
content is apparent. In the case at hand, the service provider was found
liable of breach of Ms. Lacoste's right to her image. 78 The Versailles
Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the trial court, but without
rejecting these findings concluded that the terms of the ISP contract

71.
Le directeur d'un service de communication audiovisuelle est celui qui peut
exercer son contrble avant la publication, celui qui a la maitrise du contenu du service.
The decision is available at httphlvwvw.afa-france.com/html/actionjugement htm.
72.
Socit Infonie, supra note 69.
73.
Lacoste v. Multimania Production, T.G.I., Nanterre, Dec. 8,1999. On June 8,

2000, the Court of Appeal of Versailles overturned the decision in part, stating that the
obligation of the ISP was one of"means" not "result" under civil law principles. The ISP
must be "vigilant" but it not obligated to monitor all the content hosted on its servers. The
decision
(im French) is available at httpJIvi.v.juriscom.netltxtrjurisfrlimg/
caversai~les20000608.htm. See also Arrt Lacoste c/Multimania, ou le sens do rHquilibre
entre le rle de rhbergeur et celui du judge, available at http:/w, .afaFrance.com/html/action/220600.htm.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Dennehy, supra note 68.
78.
Lacoste, supra note 73.
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exonerated it from liability. The Appellate Court also noted that
imposing on ISPs an obligation to monitor might encroach upon freedom
79
of speech.
In light of the apparent conflict between these cases, an amendment
to French law was recently tabled. 80 It is referred to as the Bloche
amendment, after the member of Parliament who introduced it.8 1
According to the text of the amendment, service providers would be
liable if they also provided the content; they would also have to act
quickly to prevent access to litigious content when ordered to do so by a
judicial authority.8 2 Finally, their liability could be involved if they do

not take diligent measures after receiving a notice from a rightsholder
concerning litigious content. 83 That said, only a judicial authority could
decide whether the content is illicit. The French National Assembly
adopted this amendment on June 28, 2000.84

C. Germany
As for other EU countries covered, this Article directs the reader's
attention to Part III on the European copyright and e-commerce
directives, which, when fully implemented, will impact the law and
practice of EU Member States. There are some difficulties in
determining the right applicable to Internet transmissions in Germany.
In the absence of clear case law, the Article tries to foresee how the
existing laws would be interpreted.
1. The Right of Reproduction
The definition of the right of reproduction is contained in section 16
of the German Copyright Act.8 5 A reproduction occurs when a copy of

79.
See id.
80.
The
amendment
was tabled
on May
18,
1999.
See
http://www.patrickbloche.org/ national/internet/responsabilities.html# 16. Mr. Bloche has
his own website and an English-language summary of the report on which he based his
amendment is available at http://www.patrickbloche.org/national/internet/internetplA.html.
81.
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, Address at the University of Communication in
Hourtin, available at http://62.160.66.10/actual/evenements/cybercrim/jospin2.gb.html
(Aug. 26, 1999).
82.
See Art. 43-8 of Title II of Law No. 86-1067 on September 30, 1986 concerning
the freedom of communication, as amended on June 28, 2000.
83.
Id. See http://www.patrickbloche.orglnational/internet/responsabilites.html for
a full text of the debate in the French National Assembly and results of the vote which
adopted the amendment.
84.
Id. The official text of the new law is available on the website of the National
Assembly at http:/www.assemblee-nat.fr/ta/ta0553.asp.
85.
The 1965 "Urheberrechtgesetz," (Copyright Act) § 16(1) (BGB1. I.S. 1273). See
also Adolf Dietz, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, GER-99- 100

(Melville Nimmer & Paul Geller eds., 1991).
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the work is made by any means. 88 The storage of a work in a computer
memory--on a server-is a reproduction that requires an authorization
unless a specific exemption applies.
Are end-users also making reproductions requiring authorizations
when they listen to musical works without keeping copies of the work in
their computer memory? This is an open question. If the copy is
temporary and made for technical reasons, it could be viewed as an
ephemeral reproduction. If, on the other hand, listening to music in
streaming mode is associated with broadcasting, it does not involve a
reproduction requiring an authorization because, under German law,
broadcasting seems to preclude the application of the reproduction
87
right.
In fact, the "reproduction right" is a translation of the German
Vervielf'dltigungsrecht.8s This notion seems to imply the making of
physical copies. In fact, a better translation might be the "right to
reproduce in material form." When the music is listened to as it is being
transmitted, is a physical copy made? No copy of the complete musical
work occurs while it is listened to in streaming mode. The musical work
is never complete in the computer memory of the user; sounds are just
transmitted without ever being stored on the hard disk. The law also
states that a single copy is sufficient to apply the exclusive right of the
author.89 Even if a single digital copy is posted on a server, it infringes
the reproduction right-unless properly authorized. 90
2. The Right of Exploitation
Once the work is digitally reproduced and posted on a web page or
other server, the right of "exploitation" of the work comes into play. This
right includes both the right to exploit the work in a material form and
the right to communicate it to the public in a non-material form. 91 It is
contained in section 15 of the Act 92 and includes broadcasting. 93 The
broadcasting right is defined in section 20. The term "broadcasting" is
probably not the best translation. Indeed, the term "transmission"
would be better because "broadcasting" is usually limited to wireless
transmission, whereas the definition in the law includes both wireless
and wire transmissions.
The copyright owner is also granted a right of communication by a
visual or sound recording means. This occurs, for example, when the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Ureheberrechtgesetz, § 16.
Dietz, supra note 85, at GER-99.
Id.
Ureheberrechtgesetz, § 16.
Id.
Dietz, supra note 85, at GER-99.
Ureheberrechtgesetz, § 15(1).
Dietz, supranote 85, at GER-103-04.
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musical work is streamed without a complete copy being made in the
computer memory. 94 Section 21 must be read in conjunction with
paragraph 3 of section 19, which states that this right is composed of the
right to communicate to the public a work on a screen, through a speaker
or by any other technical means. The expression "other technical
means" is broad enough to encompass certain communications via the
Internet. 95
Copyright owners are granted a "transmission right" and can
authorize or prohibit the transmission of their work via the Internet-in
the same way they could with broadcasting or cable transmissions. To
be protected under the law, this transmission must be public. 96 "A
communication is deemed public if it is intended for a number of
persons, unless such persons form a clearly defined group and are
interconnected personally by mutual relations or by a relationship to the
organizer of the communication." 97 Putting a musical work on a web
page to reach the public via an Internet transmission is thus a public
transmission.
3. The Right of Distribution
The question here is whether the German distribution right applies
Internet
transmissions of music. When music is streamed over the
to
Internet, the distribution right probably does not apply because this
right seems to apply to the distribution of physical copies. For the same
reason, when a user downloads music on his computer memory, the
distribution right will not apply because it is not a material copy that is
offered to the public and then sent. Rather, it is coming into being only
after transmission and therefore regarded as a new copy-which has not
been distributed. 98 During the transmission of a musical work, no
physical copy is made and, therefore, the distribution right would not
seem to apply.
4. German Transmissions
A communication to the public generally will be considered to have
occurred in Germany when the server, which emits the signal of
transmission, is located in Germany. 99 As a member of the European
Union, it is the law of the country of emission that applies-to satellite
transmissions. Applying those rules to the Internet, a communication to

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Ureheberrechtgesetz, § 21.
Id. at § 19(3).
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 59, at 202.
Dietz, supra note 85, at GER-103-04.
Ureheberrechtgesetz, § 17.
See Lothar Determann, The New GermanInternet Law, 22 HASTINGS INT'L &

COMP. L. REV. 113, 159 (1998).
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the public would take place in Germany when the server that emits the
10 0
transmission is located in Germany.
5. Liability Issues
In 1997, the German government enacted what it termed a
"multimedia law," officially entitled FederalAct Establishingthe General
Conditions for Information and Communication Services.1° 1 This law
contains seven sections relating to communications. Article 1 deals with
"teleservices;" Article 2 with the protection of data within the framework
of teleservices; Article 3 with digital signatures; Article 4 with criminal
measures; Article 5 with the regulation of acts contrary to public policy;
Article 6 with the distribution of publications that present a danger for
young readers; and finally Article 7, which contains amendments
required to implement the European database directive.' 0 2 The main
impact of this legislation for Internet transmissions is related to the
liability of service providers.
While it is clear that the content provider is liable for posting
unauthorized material, liability is doubtful in the case of service
providers. The 1997 law concerning the liability of the service providers
on the Internet distinguishes among content providers, access providers,
service providers, and users.1 03 The content provider is the person who
posts information on the Internet to make it available to users. The
service provider provides the server and the software to publish the
information. The access provider provides users with access to the
Internet through online connection and accounts.
The responsibility thus follows from the role played in the
transmission. Section 5 of Article 1 of the law spells out quite clearly the
extent of the service providers' potential liability:
Responsibility 1) Providers shall be responsible in accordance with general

laws for their own content, which they make available for use.
2) Providers shall not be responsible for any third party content which
they make available for use unless they have knowledge of such content
and are technically able and can reasonably be expected to block the use of
such content.
3)Providers shall not be responsible for any third party content to which
they only provide access. The automatic and temporary storage of third
party content due to user request shall be considered as providing access.
4) The obligations in accordance with general laws to block the use of
illegal content shall remain unaffected if the provider obtains knowledge

100.

Id.

101. Informations - und Kommunickationsdienste-Gesetz (IuKDG) (Federal Act
Establishing the General Conditions for Information and Communication Services]. v.
1.7.1997 (BGBI.IS.1870), availableat ;wvv.iid.de/rahmen/iukdgbeLhtml [hereinafter Law].

102.
103.

Id,
Id.
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of such content while complying with telecommunications secrecy under
§85 of the Telecommunication Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz) and if
104
blocking is technically feasible and can reasonably be expected.

It should be noted that access providers might be liable if they know that
illegal content is being transmitted. An access provider, a service
provider, and a user can become content providers by installing
hyperlinks on a web page. They would then be liable under paragraph 1
of section 5 of the Multimedia Law and be considered secondary content
providers. 105
D. Japan
The rights potentially involved in the transmission of music over
the Internet in Japan are the reproduction right, the transmission right,
the right of public performance, and the right of making phonograms
available.
A distribution right also applies, but only to
cinematographic-audiovisual-works. 0 6
Amendments to those
rights-relating specifically to Internet transmissions-came into force
in 1997 to comply with the two WIPO Treaties of December 1996.107
These rights are discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
1. The Right of Reproduction
The reproduction right granted to the copyright owner is contained
in Article 21.
Producers of phonograms and "wire diffusion
organizations" also have a reproduction right.' 0 8 Limitations to this
right include reproductions for private use-Article 30.109 The exception
for reproduction for private use may apply to Internet transmissions of

104. Id. art. 1, § 5.
105.
Determann, supra note 99, at 153-54.
106. Japanese Copyright Act, Law No. 48 of May 6, 1970, art. 26.
107.
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, available at
www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/copyright/index.html (Dec. 20, 1996); World Intellectual Property
Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, availableat www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/
performances/index.html (Dec. 20, 1996).
108.
Japanese Copyright Act, arts. 96, 100.
109. Id. art. 30. See also id. art. 31 (applying exceptions to reproductions in
libraries); id. art. 35 (applying exceptions to reproductions in school textbooks,
reproductions in schools and other educational institutions); id. art. 36 (applying
exceptions to reproductions in examination questions); id. art. 37 (applying exceptions to
reproductions in Braille); id. art. 39 (applying exceptions to reproductions of articles on
current topics); id. art. 42 (applying exceptions to reproductions for judicial proceedings);
id. art. 47 (applying exceptions to reproductions required for an exhibition of artistic
works); id. art. 47bis (applying exceptions to reproductions by the owner of a copy of a
program work).
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Article 30(1) states that reproduction for personal use is

permitted.

110

While it is obvious that the reproduction right is involved in the
storage of a protected work on a commercial server from which users
download music, it is not clear whether the recipients also make a
reproduction requiring authorizations. Do they reproduce for "private
use?" The answer seems to be contained in Article 30(2): if the recipient
downloads music from a Web server, he must pay compensation to the
copyright owner as the author of the work-and the producer. It has not
been determined with absolute certainty which Internet-based
downloads-such as those using kiosk technology-would fit into the
definition of "automatic reproducing machine." In any case, there are
only two possibilities: (1) if the type of use is covered by the exception to
the private use exception, then no authorization is required, only the
payment of compensation-presumably, this compensation would be
part of the fee charged to the end-user either on the medium itself or as
part of the transaction-; or (2) the end-user copy is private use."1 The
former is a more appropriate answer than the latter, from both policy
and business standpoints: music downloads-especially if a permanent
copy is retained by the end-user-may replace certain sales of
12
carriers."
2. The Right of Public Performance
Is music in streaming mode included in the definition of a
"performance" under Japanese law? Performance is described as the
acting on stage, dance, musical playing, singing, delivering, declaiming,
or performing in other ways of a work and includes similar acts not
involving the performance of a work that are of the nature of "public
entertainment." 113 At first blush, a musical work that a user listens to
directly from his computer-without necessarily storing the music on his
hard disk or other digital medium-seems to be a performance, because
"performing in other ways" could apply to this type of use of music on the
Internet. At the end of Article 2, however, the right of public
performance seems to be inapplicable to transmissions of musical works
on the Internet:
In this Law, 'performance and recitation' include the performance or
recitation of a work by means of sound or visual recordings, not falling
within the term 'public transmission' or 'presentation' and the
communication by means of telecommunication installations of

110.

Terou Doi, Japan,in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 85, at JAP-

111.
112.

See id. at JAP-54-56.
See infra note 195 and accompanying text.

113.

Doi, supranote 110, at JAP-54.

54.
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performances or recitations of works, not falling within the term public
114
transmission.

The concept of performance is thus set aside because the
transmission of music on the Internet-simultaneous or not-is included
in a definition of public transmission in Article 2(1)(viibis) of the Act.
3. The Right of Transmission
The amended Japanese Copyright Act changed the traditional
definition of "transmission." Before the 1997 amendments, Article 23
read, "the author shall exclusively have the right to broadcast or
transmit by cable his work."1 15 In 1997, the Diet replaced the right to
broadcast a work or transmit it by cable with a "right of public
transmission." 1 16 The expression "public transmission" now includes
wire and wireless transmission, but also "automatic public
transmissions," which are defined as transmissions made automatically
upon request of the receiver. 117 Indeed, the definition of "public
transmission" refers to "wire, telecommunication intended for direct
reception by the public." 118 A transmission using the Internet is a
telecommunication intended for direct reception by the public. Music
listened to in streaming mode by the recipient seems to be covered by
this definition. When the music is not listened to while it is being
communicated, this is considered an "interactive transmission." This
kind of transmission occurs when a user downloads a file from a website
for later listening. This transmission, as indicated by law, is also a
public transmission.1 1 9
In addition to granting copyright owners a right to publicly transmit
their work, Article 23 enables them to make that work available to the
public. Consequently, the exclusive right of the copyright owner is
broader; it includes the right to authorize any public transmission such
as broadcast, cable, or interactive transmissions.
4. The Right to "Make the Work Available" to the Public
A work is "made available to the public" when it can be transmitted
on the Internet. Therefore, the work does not need to be downloaded by

114. Japanese Copyright Act, art. 2 (emphasis added).
115. Id. art. 23.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 2 (noting that "[i]nteractive transmission' means the public
transmission made automatically in response to a request from the public, excluding the
public transmission falling within the term 'broadcasting' or'wire-diffusion'). See also id.
art. 23(1).
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an actual user to be public, which eliminates the arguments that to be
public a transmission has to be simultaneous. 20
5. Japanese Transmissions
Japanese copyright law applies to public transmissions that "take
place" in Japan. A public transmission is said to occur in Japan basically
when the server is situated in Japan--or when the transmission is made
by a Japanese organization.' 2 1 The transmission takes place when a
user requests the file containing the music. In other words, the law of
122
the place of transmission applies.
6. Liability Issues
Any person who, without consent, converts information in a form
compatible with a digital public transmission and provides means to
perform this transmission seems to be liable for infringement. If a
provider is not involved in making the work available and only
administers the server, it probably cannot be found liable. It seems
excessive to ask providers to control every exchange of information
occurring on their servers. That being said, to avoid being considered
negligent under Japanese law, providers have to maintain some
reasonable means to prevent or deter copyright infringement.
E. United Kingdom
As for other EU countries covered, this Article directs the reader's
attention to Part III on the European copyright and e-commerce
directives, which, when fully implemented, will impact the law and
practice of EU Member States.
A 1997 U.K. court decision concluded that Internet transmissions
were in some respects similar to cable transmissions. Thus, rules
applicable to the latter would also apply to communication by electronic
means:
In my view the pursuers' contention that the service provided by them
involves the sending of information is prima facie well founded. Although
in a sense the information, it seems, passively awaits access being had to
it by callers, that does not, at least prima facie, preclude the notion that

the information, on such access being taken, is conveyed to and received by
the caller. If that is so, the process may arguably be said to involve the
sending of that information ..... While the facility to comment or make
suggestions via the Internet exists, this does not appear to me to be an
essential element in the service, the primary function of which is to

120.
121.
122.

See id. art. 4(1).
Doi, supra note 110, at JAP-77.
Japanese Copyright Act, art. 9.
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distribute news and other items. In any event, it is arguable that this
123
facility is a severable part of the pursuers' cable programme service.

Several rights are involved in the transmission of a copyright work via
the Internet occurring in the United Kingdom. Those rights include the
reproduction right, the right of communication to the public, and the
right of public performance.
1. The Right of Reproduction
The right of reproduction is directly involved in an Internet
transmission. When a person converts a musical work to make it
transmittable on the Internet and copies this musical work on a digital
storage medium, at least two reproductions of the work occur-albeit
ephemerally in certain cases. 12 4 Section 17 of the U.K. Act states that
the storage of a work in any medium by electronic means is a
reproduction. 125 The reproduction-transient or not-in computer
memory is covered by the exclusive right of the copyright owner unless a
126
specific exemption applies.
Is an authorization necessary for the reproduction made by the
recipient-end-user---on a hard disk or other storage medium? Is it a
copy for private use-fair dealing? Because this reproduction takes the
form of a distribution, the reproduction arguably needs to be licensed,
but the Author found no confirmation of this in U.K. case law. From the
viewpoint of the normal commercial exploitation of and access to the
work-one of the three-steps of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention 127 there is little difference between downloading the musical work on a
computer memory and purchasing a record in a store. 128 There is,
however, a distinct possibility that the end-user copy would be
12 9
considered fair dealing.
2. The Right of Public Performance
If the musical work is listened to at the same moment as the
recipient is reproducing it in his computer memory, a performance of the

123.
124.
125.

Shetland Times v. Wills, [1997] F.S.R. 604, 608 (Scot. OH).
Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 17(6) (U.K.).
Id. § 17(2).

126.

William R. Cornish, United Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND

PRACTICE, supra note 85, at UK-89-90.
127.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, available
at www.wipo.intltreaties/ip/berne/index.html.
128.
The main difference is probably that in a store, music is bundled in an "album."
"The new technology may be promoting a 'new' business model, in which the content is
easily unbundled and as a consequence marketed and sold in smaller chunks." NRC
Report, supra note 1, at 94.
129.
Cornish, supra note 126, at UK-103.
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work takes place. 130 An authorization must therefore be obtained. A
performance includes the delivery of the work by speeches, lectures,
visual or acoustic presentation, and presentation by cable distribution,
broadcasting, or sound recording.1 3 1 By analogy, it appears that
listening to music in streaming mode is a performance under U.K.
13 2
law.
To be covered under the exclusive right of the copyright owner in
the musical work, the performance must be public. Here, courts have
stated that the distinction made between public and private audiences
was a purely factual question.' 3 3 The test to apply to determine if a
communication is public is: "whether the persons coming together to
form the audience are bound together by a domestic or private tie, or by
an aspect of their public life." 1 3 4 The relationship of the public to the
owner of copyright must also be taken into account. On the basis of
these criteria, a Web-based performance would be public.
3. U.K. Transmissions
When does a transmission-and possible infringement-occur in the
U.K.? Using the above analogy with broadcasting-the person
responsible for the broadcasting act is the one who sends the
information, thus the theory of emission applies-it seems that under
U.K. law, as it stands, a communication via the Internet occurs when the
information is sent to the recipient and therefore where the server is
135
located.
4. Liability Issues
Is the service provider liable for unauthorized music transmissions?
This is only partly answered by section 16(2) of the U.K. Act. 3 This is
a difficult question to answer because of the complexity of the role that
each participant plays in the transmission. Would the service provider
be liable for the reproduction of a work when he cannot know whether
works are licensed and when he is not able to control transmissions
occurring on his server? A provider who simply provides services
without controlling the content being made on a server should not be
held liable for an infringing reproduction, and the European Copyright

130.
Id. at UK-98.
131.
Id
132.
Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, § 19(1).
Jennings v. Stephens, 1 All E.R 409,411 (1936).
133.
134.
1 Kevin Garnett et al., COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGT" § 7.126
(14th ed. 1998).

135.

Id- § 7-134.

136.

Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, § 16(2).
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Directive, which is subsequently addressed, confirms this. 137 That may
already be the law in the United Kingdom: Copinger and Skone James
made
come to this conclusion by making an analogy with photocopiers
138
available in libraries and works sent by fax machines.
On the other hand, the liability of the provider could be involved if
operating the equivalent of a cable service-with some degree of control
over the content made available. In the Shetland Times case, the court
held that the operator of a website that had sent content at the request
of a subscriber had infringed copyright. 139 In other words, if a provider
has-and one could perhaps add, should have had-control over the
will change once the EU
content, a finding of liability is possible. This
140
Copyright Directive is fully implemented.
It is also worth nothing that the service provider may be held liable
for authorizing an exclusive act done without the consent of the
copyright owner. "Authorisation means the grant or purported grant,
which may be express or implied, of the right to do the act complained of,
whether the intention is that the grantee should do the act on his own
account, or only on account of the grantor."'141 A person will be deemed
to authorize an act when he asks someone else to do it and gives the
permission to do it or grants someone else the right to do it. 142 A person,

however, will not be held liable for infringement by simply providing the
means to do the infringing act, even where the provider knows that the
means will be used in an unlawful way. 143 Finally, the fact that the
is not relevant if the
infringing act occurs outside of the United Kingdom
1 44
authorization is given in this jurisdiction.

137.
138.

See infra Part III.
Garnett et al., supra note 134, § 7-20.

Thus in the simple example of a photocopier provided by a library, a member of the
public who uses the photocopier to make a copy is clearly the person who copies
the work, not the librarian. In the technically more complex case of the sending of
a fax, where the sender causes a copy to be made automatically by the receiver's
remote fax machine, it is suggested that the sender is the person who is
responsible for copying the work which is sent, not the person in control of the
receiving fax machine.
Id.
139.
Shetland Times v. Wills, [1997] F.S.R. 604, 609 (Scot. OH).
140.
See infra Part III.
141.
Garnett et al., supra note 134, § 7-151.
142.
Id.
See Amstrad Consumer Electronics, plc v. British Phonographic Industry, Ltd.
143.
[1986] F.S.R. 159 (UKHL); see also CBS Songs Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics, plc,
[1988] 2 ALL ER 484 (UKHL).
144.
See ABKCO Music & Records, Inc. v. Music Collection International Ltd.,
[1995] R.P.C. 657.
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F. United States
1. Important Concepts of U.S. Copyright Law
It may be useful, especially for non-U.S. readers, to recall some
fundamental concepts of U.S. copyright law that distinguish it from the
copyright laws of other countries.
First, one must distinguish between the concepts of "musical work,"
"sound recording," and "phonorecord." As in the Berne Convention and
the copyright laws of most countries, the underlying musical works
embodied in sound recordings are protected as such.1 45 The sound
recording itself-which contains a performance of a particular musical
work-is also given copyright protection as a separate work. 14 6 This
obviates the need for a neighboring right. The third related concept, the
14 7
phonorecord, refers to the object-or copy-such as a compact disk.
The text of the relevant definitions is contained in 17 U.S.C. § 101. It is
very important to understand the definitions not only of the categories of
works to which such exclusive rights apply, but also the nature of the
rights themselves and the exceptions thereto.
The first relevant definition is the word "perform," which is defined
in section 101 as "to recite, render, play, dance or act [a work,] either
directly or by means of any device or process... ."148 The exclusive right
only applies to public performances. The Copyright Act 149 also defines
the expression "to perform or display a work publicly" as follows:
(i) to perform or display [a work) at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (ii) to transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same
150
time or at different times.

It is also relevant to look at the definition of "transmission," as
specifically applied to the musical field. The Act defines the expression
"to transmit a performance or display" as communicating it by any
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the
15 1
place from which they are sent.
Finally, as indicated above, it is necessary to look at the
fundamental exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright owners.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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There are two types of exceptions, the impact of which is quite different.
First, under section 107 certain uses of copyrighted works are considered
"fair use" and do not require the authorization of the copyright holder. 1I 2
To qualify as fair use, a particular use must be examined according to
four criteria. These criteria are:
(1)

The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature and is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2)

The nature of the copyrighted work;

(3)

The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4)

The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
153
copyrighted work.

The Act lists as purposes that may be considered fair use criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.
A second class of exceptions are cases where a compulsory license is
imposed and a mechanism set to determine the price to be paid for a
particular use covered by such licenses. 5 4 Such licenses apply to
musical works, not sound recordings. There are two relevant compulsory
licenses to consider: the compulsory license affecting the mechanical
reproduction of musical works and the compulsory license concerning the
digital transmission of music. 155 A mechanical reproduction license is
required to reproduce music in a form that requires a mechanical device
to listen to the music. The mechanical license rates in the United States
as of January 1, 2000 are $7.55 per song or $1.45 per minute,
156
whichever amount is larger.
The second relevant compulsory license applies to the digital
delivery of phonorecords. 157 The Library of Congress Copyright Office
issued regulations concerning this compulsory license on January 29,
1999.158 This decision was based on the 1995 Digital Performance Right
in Sound Recordings Act. 159 This Act defined "digital phonorecord
delivery" as each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital
transmission of a sound recording that results in a specifically
identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission recipient of a
phonorecord of that sound recording. 160 While an agreement was

152.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
153.
Id.; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
154.
17 U.S.C. § 115.
155.
Id.
156.
37 C.F.R. § 255.3 (1998).
157.
17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(A).
158.
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 64
Fed. Reg. 6221 (Feb. 9, 1999); Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a
Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 14227 (Mar. 16, 2000).
159.
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (1996).
160.
Id.
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reached among the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),
the National Music Publishers Association (NMEPA), and the Harry Fox
Agency (HFA), various comments were filed, including by the U.S.
performing rights societies, which led to certain clarifications of the
agreement. This in turn led to the issuance of the rate payable under
the compulsory license for digital phonorecord deliveries. For digital
phonorecord deliveries made on or after January 1, 1998, the rate
payable for such deliveries is identical to the rate of the mechanical
reproduction license already mentioned, except for deliveries where the
reproduction or distribution of a phonorecord is incidental to the
transmission.' 6 ' No decision was reached on the rate that may be
payable in the case of reproductions or distributions that are incidental
to the transmission process. It is worth noting that this compulsory
162
license does not apply to webcasting.
2. The Right of Reproduction
With respect to the right of reproduction-as with the right of public
performance-there are situations in which it is not possible to give a
definite answer. While it is certain that a reproduction takes place both
in the case of digital deliveries and streaming, 6 3 the question remains
whether these reproductions are in fact subject to the exclusive rights of
the rightsholder in the underlying musical work-if any. In case such
exclusive rights do apply, would the statutory license rates apply?
When a sound recording is downloaded, a copy is made on the
recipient's computer or an optical storage device chosen by the recipient.
Clearly, a copy also was present on the server from which the download
took place-or on a server to which such server had access, in the case of,
for example, portals. In the case of streaming, there similarly needs to
be a copy of the work on the server or origin of the transmission and
then a copy of the work-albeit not necessarily the entire work at any
one time-is made on the recipient's computer. In the case of "pure"
streaming, no permanent copy is made on the recipients computer or
other device. In addition to the above, transient and other copies are
necessarily made on various technical devices used for Internet
transmissions. These may include cache-proxy servers-mirror sites
and servers or RAM. The interesting difference between traditional
mechanical reproductions and digital delivery is that the copy is not in
fact made by the licensee but by the "inducer." At first blush, this would
thus seem to be conduct covered more under the Audio Home Recording
Act than by the exclusive reproduction right in musical work. From this
perspective, both in the case of streaming and digital deliveries, the only

161.

Id

162.

17 U.S.C. § 115(d).

163.

See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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copy that would have to be licensed would be the one residing on the
server of origin. Naturally, this position would be strongly opposed by
the music publishers who have started collecting for the digital download
of music in the United States, on the basis of the statutory rate already
mentioned. The Ninth Circuit also indicated very clearly that "space
shifting" fair use only applies when there is no simultaneous distribution
of copyrighted material-fair use only applies when the material is
1 64
already legally in the user's hands.
While the decision was made to apply the existing mechanical
reproduction rate to digital deliveries, the existing rate structure does
not take into account the many business models that digital technology
makes possible. For instance, there could be a single download of a file
with the right to listen to it a specific number of times, which would
amount to a single copy made on the recipient's computer and thus
potentially need to be licensed only once. The same user could license
the right to stream the same song five times, never making a permanent
copy. The practical result in the eyes of the user is exactly the same,
with the possible difference that the user needs to be connected to the
Internet to be able to use streaming audio. An agreement was signed on
October 29, 2001 between the RIAA and the HFA that determines how
the tariff for mechanical reproduction applies to this new
environment. 165 The agreement covers both "on-demand stream" and
16 6
music downloads.
In interpreting the scope of the mechanical reproduction right,
section 112 of the Copyright Act dealing with ephemeral recordings
should also be taken into account. For instance, if an organization is
licensed to publicly perform a work, then it is not a violation of section
106-exclusive rights-to make more than one copy or phonorecord of a
particular transmission program embodying the performance or display
if the copy or phonorecord in question is used solely by the transmitting
organization. 1 67 Section 112(a) also contains a statutory license that
allows a transmitting organization entitled to transmit to the public a

164.

John W. Belknap, Recent Developments, Copyright Law and Napster, 5 J.

SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 183, 188 (2001).

Despite Napster's claims, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster users' space-shifting
was not the same as Sony time-shifting because, unlike time-shifters in Sony who
made videotape copies for personal use, Napster's space-shifting users
automatically released any MP3 files copied onto their computers for potential
download by millions of Napster users.
Id. See also Sara Beth A. Reyburn, Fair Use, Digital Technology, and Music on the
Internet, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 991 (2000).
165.
See Agreement, at nmpa.org/pr/finaIRLAAAgreement.pdf.
166.
See id. 1.1. In the FAQ about the agreement released on November 7, 2001,
HFA states that "[the Agreement recognizes that on-demand streaming and limited
downloads offered by online subscription services require mechanical licenses and payment of
mechanical royalties." See Agreement FAQ, at httpJ/nmpa.org/pr/RIAA-Agreement.FAQ.pdf.
167.
17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1994).
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performance of a sound recording to make no more than one phonorecord
of the sound recording, provided that: (a) the phonorecord-copy-is
retained and used solely by the transmitting organization that made it;
(b) the phonorecord is used solely for the transmitting organization's own
transmissions originating in the United States under a statutory license;
(c) the phonorecord is destroyed within six months of the date the sound
recording was first transmitted-unless preserved exclusively for
purposes of archival preservation; and (d) phonorecords of the sound
recording in question have been distributed to the public under the
authority of the copyright owner and the phonorecord made under this
license is made from a phonorecord lawfully made and acquired. 1cs
Procedures are underway before the United States Copyright Office to
determine the appropriate rate. The rate to be agreed, however, was to
be valid only until December 31, 2000 and new negotiations must
therefore continue to determine the appropriate rate as of 2001.169
3. The Right of Public Performance
The two main rights that apply to the underlying musical work are
the right of mechanical reproduction and the right of public performance.
Clearly, when a work is broadcast on the Internet using, for example,
streaming audio technology, a public performance occurs. The definition
of "to perform" is not limited to specific technological measures. Quite
to the contrary, it is much more difficult to say whether a pure download
of music, in which the user makes a permanent copy on a hard disk or
optical storage device, also involves a public performance. If one looks at
the 1996 WCT' 70 and the fact that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
purported to implement that Treaty, one would be tempted to conclude
that a public performance takes place in almost all those cases because
that right seems to be the right corresponding to the new right of
communication to the public contained in the Treaty. This WCT right
clearly covers online transmissions of music and other protected works.
Article 8 of the WCT grants a right concerning "the making available to
the public of their works in a way that the members of the public may
access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them." 171 WIPO, in an explanatory note about the Treaty, stated that,
"the quoted expression (Article 8) covers in particular on-demand,
interactive communication through the Internet." 172 That being said,
while the WIPO Treaty may serve as a guide to interpret the extent of

168.
17 U.S.C. § 112(a).
169.
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(A).
170.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 43.
171.
Id. art. 8.
172.
WPPT 1996, at httpJ/w'wAwipo.int/eng/generallcopyright.wpp'htm. This
language was also used in a Swedish government document available at httpJA,vAw.jmk
su.selglobal96fglobal97/leve12/projects/cop/filesfimtcop.htm v~ipo.
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the public performance right in the United States, there are valid
arguments to support the view that certain online transmissions of
music do not constitute a public performance of the underlying musical
work. Before going into the details of this position, it may be worth
noting that to weaken the public performance rights in musical work
may have the domino effect of weakening the new right in sound
recordings contained in section 106(6) of the Copyright Act, which grants
an exclusive right in the case of sound recordings to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Does this definition of transmission confirm that such a transmission is
in fact a public performance under the Copyright Act and that this would
173
then extend to the underlying musical work?
Clearly, there are solid arguments that can be used to show that a
digital transmission during which the user does not listen to the music
but merely copies file onto a hard disk or optical storage device does not
constitute a public performance. First, if in the case of a sound recording
the law was specifically amended to refer to performance by
transmission-also because the Act does not refer to transmission with
respect to performances of musical works, but rather to the notion of
"public performance"-one might infer that such transmissions are not
in fact public performances of music but only of the sound recording.
This would not mesh with the traditional interpretation of rights in
sound recordings, particularly in countries with a neighboring right
tradition, according to which rights in sound recordings cannot be higher
than the rights in the underlying musical work. The definition of "to
perform" refers to rendering the work and, in the case of an audiovisual
work, making the sounds audible. When a computer file is transferred
from one computer to another, is the musical work in fact "rendered?"
Clearly, it is not made audible at that point. The problem is quite
different from that of video time-shifting because the video transmission
or broadcast is in fact received. A copy is made for later viewing, but
what was received at the time of the recording would have been fully
perceptible by the user at the time of the transmission.
In response to this argument, one could argue that the only real
difference between a broadcast or transmission that is perceptible by the
user at the time of the broadcast or transmission and the online delivery
of sound recording is the fact that it will be perceptible later once the

173.
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1994). Under § 114, however, the performance
of a sound recording by means of a retransmission is not an infringement of § 106 under
certain conditions. Id. In addition, under §§ 114(d)(1) and 114(j), this exclusive right does
not apply to non-subscription broadcast transmissions, retransmission of a nonsubscription broadcast transmission-under certain conditions-and certain other
transmissions. Id. Finally, a statutory license applies to many of the transmissions that
do come under the exclusive right provided for in § 106(6). Id. The analysis of this now
right granted the record producers is beyond the scope of this Article.
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user activates the appropriate device, if not at the time of the
transmission. It is thus the functional equivalent of time-shifting.
Another seemingly potent argument in favor of the conclusion that
a digital delivery of music is in fact a public performance lies in the
definition of "to perform a work publicly." This definition specifically
refers to transmissions. 174 That said, this is a definition of a "public"
performance and not of a performance itself. Moreover, what has to be
transmitted is a performance of a musical work and one may question
whether a sound recording is indeed a performance of a musical work. A
sound recording is defined as a fixation of sounds and not as a rendering
175
of sounds.
In considering the arguments for and against the application of the
public performance right in the context of a digital phonorecord delivery,
one can also refer to the historical and revision notes on Title 17.176 The
House Report states that "any individual is performing whenever he or
she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or communicates
the performance by turning on a receiving set."177 This would seem to
indicate that the performance must be audible at that point, which in
the Author's opinion is conveyed by the use of "turning on." That said, in
its discussion of the definition of"to perform," the Report goes on to state
that:
A performance may be accomplished either directly or by means of any
device or process, including all kinds of equipment for reproducing or
amplifying sounds or visual images, any sort of transmitting apparatus,
any type of electronic retrieval system, and any other techniques and
1 78
systems not yet in use or even invented.

This definition would arguably cover digital delivery, which may be said
to constitute or use a "transmitting apparatus" or an "electronic retrieval
system." Congress apparently had in mind a fairly broad definition.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the application of the
public performance right resides in the text of section 115(c)(3) which
states that
A compulsory license under this section includes the right of the
compulsory licensee to distribute or authorize the distribution of a
phonorecord of a nondramatic musical work by means of a digital
transmission which constitutes a digital phonorecord delivery, regardless

174.

17 U.S.C.§ 101.

[T]o transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to...
the public by means of any device or process, whether the members of the pubhc
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times.

Id.
175.

Id.

176.

COPYRIGHT LAW REvIsIoN, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476.

177.
178.

Id.
Id.
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of whether the digital transmission is also a public performance of the
sound recording under Section 106(6) of this title or of any nondramatic
17 9
musical work embodied therein under Section 106(4) of this title.

From this text, one may draw two conclusions: (1) that digital
phonorecord deliveries are a subset of digital transmissions; and (2) that
such phonorecord deliveries constitute a distribution of a phonorecord,
which may have a direct impact on the application of the right of
importation-addressed later. Because section 106(6) reads "to perform
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission,"
one may argue that all digital audio transmissions-which include
digital phonorecord deliveries under section 115-are in fact public
performances. One could also refer to section 114(d)(2) dealing with "the
performance of a sound recording publicly by means of a subscription
digital audio transmission ...."180

This view is further supported by section 112(e)(10), which reads in
part as follows:
Nothing in the subsection annuls, limits, impairs or otherwise affects in
any way the existence or value of any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owners in a sound recording, except as otherwise provided in
this subsection, or in a musical work, including the exclusive rights to
reproduce and distribute sound recording or musical work, including by
means of a digital phonorecord delivery, under Sections 106(1), 106(3) and
115, and the right to perform publicly a sound recording or musical work,
including by means of a digital audio transmission, under Sections 106(4)
and 106(6).181

This section, added by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, would lead
one to the conclusion that all digital audio transmissions may be public
performances and that digital phonorecord deliveries, which, as already
mentioned, constitute a form of digital audio transmission, involve also
the reproduction and distribution right. Finally, it is relevant to note
that the U.S. Copyright Office decided in December 2000 that "an
AM/FM broadcast signal over a digital communications network, such as
the Internet, are subject to a sound recording copyright owner's exclusive
right to perform his or her work publicly by means of digital audio
transmissions. Broadcasters who choose to transmit their radio signals
over a digital communications network such as the Internet may do so
18 2
under a compulsory license."
As can be seen from the above, there are valid arguments to justify
both the conclusion that a digital phonorecord delivery-without
streaming-is and is not a public performance of the underlying musical

179.
17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3) (1994).
180.
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2).
181.
17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(9).
182.
Rulemaking to Determine Whether a Transmission of an AM or FM Radio
Signal made over a Digital Communications Network by an FCC-licensed Broadcaster is
Exempt from the Digital Performance Right, 37 C.F.R. § 201(b)(2) (2000).
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work. The performing rights societies have clearly expressed their view
that any transmission of music, whether by streaming or delivery of a
file containing a sound recording, is a public performance, 183 a stand
that seems fairly convincing. The point does need to be firmly
established, however, either by a U.S. court or perhaps by industry
practice. If indeed a digital delivery-without streaming-is considered
a public performance of the underlying musical work, this would be the
first instance in which a public performance takes place and the user is
not capable of perceiving the work as it is being transmitted. *8 On the
other hand, if a court found that such deliveries do not constitute a
public performance of the musical work and the rights of reproduction
and distribution did not allow rightsholders to exercise a full exclusive
right to limit the online availability of copyrighted works, the United
States would arguably be in violation of its obligations under the
WCT.185
Unfortunately, the decision of the Ninth Circuit in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.186 did not clarify the point because the Court only
found that "at least" the right of reproduction and the right of
87
distribution were infringed.'
4. U.S. Transmissions
It is difficult to determine with absolute precision how U.S. law
would apply to a digital transmission of music to or from a foreign
country. In the case of a transmission from the United States, there is
little doubt that such transmission, to the extent that it constitutes a
public performance, needs to be cleared at the point of origin of the
transmission. This has been the practice in the United States for
broadcast, cable, and satellite transmissions. 188 Particularly in the case

183.
See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 343 (Aspen 2d ed. 1996
& Supp. 2000).
184.
This would not, for example, be considered "time.shiftinge as in Sony Corp. u.
Universal City Studies, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,449-50 (1984), because a time-shifting scenario,
the user would be able to watch or listen to the transmitted work at the time of the
transmission. In fact, in the definition of "publicly" perform or display contained in 17
U.S.C. § 101, the public must be "capable of receiving" the performance. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
Is the performance received if no one can watch or listen?
185.
Because no right would be provided to implement the making available right
contained in Article 8 WCT. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 43.
186.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
187.
Id. at 1014.
188.
Although for infringement purposes, it seems that both the place of emission
and the place of reception might be relevant. See National Football League v. PrimeTime
24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2nd Cir. 2000); see also Jennifer M. Driscoll. It's a Small
World After Al
Conflict of Laws and Copyright Infringement on the Information
Superhighway, 20 U. PA. J. INYL ECON. L. 939,978-79 (1999); Andreas P. Reindl. Chowing
Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global Networks. 19 MICH. J. INfrL. L 799,82124 (1998).
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of transmissions licensed under a statutory license, however, the rights
granted to the transmitting organization are often limited to the United
States, as the example of section 114(e) just mentioned demonstrates. In
other words, the transmitting organization may not in fact be licensed to
transmit to users in foreign countries. Under certain circumstances, the
organization may need to acquire the necessary rights in the countries of
reception, where the rights may not be the same as in the country of
origin. Copyright is still viewed and managed, even in large
multinational groups, as a territorial right and the collecting societies
administering both the reproduction and the public performance rights
180
have yet to establish a one-stop-shop for worldwide rights clearance.
If mechanical re production rights societies license copies made by
users in their territory, the licenses would be paid by the transmitting
organization, not the person actually making the copy. Some might
argue that the Copyright Act and international conventions1 90 do not
grant an exclusive reproduction right as such but rather a right to
"authorize" the reproduction. In this case, however, the copyright owner
in the musical work would be authorizing someone else to authorize the
reproduction because the copyright owner would be authorizing the
transmitting organization to authorize a user to make a copy. This is
one step removed from the concept of a right to authorize. To make
matters worse, in a number ofjurisdictions, including the United States,
the end-user copy may be considered fair use-under certain
circumstances. 191 If the reproduction made in the course of a
phonorecord delivery takes place on the recipient's computer-or other
device-the mechanical reproduction right should be cleared only once
for each transmission. Of course, the original copy on the transmitting
organization's server also needs to be licensed. It would indeed seem
preferable, as suggested in the Canadian Copyright Board's decision on
its so-called Tariff 22 decision, 192 to license the transmission only once.
Assuming that both the mechanical reproduction and the public
performance rights apply-which may or may not be the case as
discussed above-then it should be licensed only once for each right,
independently of whether the transmission takes place between a
transmitting organization and a recipient in one or two different
countries and independently of the fact that the transmission may have

189. See Andre Lucas, CopyrightLaw and TechnicalProtectionDevices, 21 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 225, 229 (1997); Jane Schurtz-Taylor, The Internet Experience and
Authors Rights: An Overview of Some of the Present and Future Problems in the Digital
Information Society, 24 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 113, 133 (1996).

190.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 26,
1971, art. 9(1), availableat http://www.wipo.int/treaties/IP/berne/index.html.
191.
Either as a time-shifting copy under the Sony doctrine discussed supra note
184 or under the Audio Home Recording Act. The application of time-shifting defenseunder the fair use doctrine-was dealt a severe blow in the Napster case. See supra note
163, at 1019.
192. See supra note 9.
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been routed through computers in various countries. This would seem to
be the only practical solution.
In the case of a transmission entering the United States, the
question arises whether the U.S. importation right applies. 193 Section
602 of the Copyright Act grants the owner of copyright in the United
States the exclusive right to authorize the importation of phonorecords
into the country.
The problem in applying the right of importation is that it applies to
phonorecords, which are defined as material objects. In the case of a
digital phonorecord delivery, no digital object in fact crosses the border,
but a material object is created on the recipients computer or other
device, which also means that the right of distribution applies. 194
Yet, the fact that the Act refers to digital phonorecord delivery
seems to imply that a phonorecord may in fact be delivered this way and,
consequently, could be considered to have been imported because it had
to enter the United States in one form or another. Again, if the
transmission originates in a foreign country, the copy is not made by the
transmitting organization but rather by the recipient who, in the United
States, could perhaps rely on the exemption for "home recordings." That
would, however, defeat the purpose of the Act because digital
phonorecord deliveries in fact replace some sales of material
phonorecords--compact discs. 195 Interestingly, in a few cases of licensed
digital phonorecord deliveries of which the Author is aware, the
transaction proceeds not as a sale but as a licensing transaction whereby
the end-user actually receives a license to use the material downloaded
under certain conditions.1 96 If indeed the industry considers that the
transmission is in fact a licensing transaction rather than a sale, then it
may be more difficult to argue that there is in fact importation and

193.
17 U.S.C. § 602 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 106(3). See also Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club,
194.
13 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. IlL 1998).
195.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001).
The court also stated that computers are not "digital audio recording devices" under the
Audio Home RecordingAct and that Napster users were not fair users. Id. at 1015. First,
because Napster users merely duplicated copyrighted works for use in another medium.
their downloading and copying of music files did not transform the copyrighted works. Id.

Second, because Napster users copied and downloaded files to obtain songs they would
otherwise have to pay for, the use was commercial in nature. Therefore the first fair use
factor favored the plaintiffs. Id. The court found that "even if Napster's service actually
increased sales of some CD's due to increases exposure-a debatable point-market harm
could still result" John W. Belknap, Recent Developments, Copyright Law and Napster,5

J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 183, 187 (2001). See also George H. Pike. A Busy Year
Ahead for Congress, INFO. TODAY 16 (May 5, 2001).
196. A good example may be found in the case of Adobe Systems, Inc. v.One Stop
Mficro, lite., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000). in which the court held that the fact that
the defendant had obtained software in violation of an educational license and restrictions
on sale to the educational community did not make the acquisition by defendant a
purchase and, consequently, the defendant's claims that Adobe's rights were exhausted
under the first-sale doctrine failed.
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distribution of a phonorecord into the United States. Conversely, if the
application of the right of importation is sought, then the first sale
doctrine may be applicable. As such, this would not pose a significant
problem if the recipient were to give, for example, a CD-RW to a friend.
In practice, however, the risk is obviously that a copy would be given to a
third party without destroying or deleting the original-downloadedcopy. A licensing transaction-perhaps accompanied by appropriate
technical measures-thus seems a logical way to proceed but may impact
the way a court would decide to apply or not the right of importation to
these transactions.
Applying the right of mechanical reproduction to copies made not by
the transmitting organization but rather by the recipient may seem a
stretch of the imagination. The problem in the United States does not
occur in all countries, however. Yet, it is certainly possible to argue that
the recording by the end-user of the phonorecord on his or her computer
or other device does not constitute fair use. Contrary to incidental
copying such as videotaping for purposes of time shifting, digital
phonorecord delivery may constitute a primary distribution channel for
the audio industry. In light of the fourth fair use criteria, namely the
19
impact on the market or value of the sound recordings in question, 7
one could argue that the recipient does need to be licensed for this type
of download. Because it would be impracticable to require that the user
obtain a license directly from either a performing rights society or a
mechanical rights society or a music publisher or any combination
thereof, it is certainly possible to conclude that the transmitting
organization should obtain this license on behalf of all those recipients
and pass the license on as the download occurs and is licensed to the
recipient. The practical solution would be that the transmitting
organization would require the appropriate license from the rightsholder
in the musical works, whether on its own behalf or on behalf of the enduser recipients.
In light of the above, it is possible to conclude that digital
phonorecord deliveries constitute a distribution. Section 112(e)(10)
seems to say so. In addition, in the famous cases Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Frena198 and A&M Records v. Napster,Inc.,199 the unauthorized
downloading of a copyrighted photo was held to infringe the plaintiffs
exclusive right of distribution. In this case, this right would be
exhausted by the first sale, and the owner of a lawful copy could dispose

197.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Debra A.
Sitzberger, Copyright Law--Who Gets the Picture?,57 WASH. L. REV. 699 (1982); Sarah H.
McWane, Comment, Hollywood vs. Silicon Valley: DeCss Down, Napster to Go?, 9
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 87 (2001); Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications
ofSony for Napster and other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (2001).
198.
Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
199.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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of it under section 109(a) of the Copyright Act. As mentioned previously,
this poses the problem of further reproductions by the recipient as noted
by the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights of the White
200
House Information Infrastructure Task Force.
Yet, this concern about the first sale doctrine is not necessarily a
major problem. Section 109(a) states that notwithstanding the exclusive
right of distribution-section 106(3)-the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made is entitled to sell or othervise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord. Making a copy of that copy is not
the same as disposing of the possession of the copy but rather making an
additional copy. The correct interpretation would thus be that while the
recipient could lawfully give a downloaded copy-for example, stored on
a CD-RW-to a third party under section 109(a), the regime governing
the making of a copy of that copy for whatever purpose is governed by
section 106(1) regarding the right of reproduction. Naturally, the fair
use exception may apply but then the fair use criteria should govern and
not the principles of the first sale doctrine.
5. Liability Issues
As for other countries under review, the question of who is liable for
copyright infringement in Internet transmissions of music will be
addressed briefly under U.S. law. The normal rule that applies is
obviously that the person who infringes one of the applicable rights, in
particular the right of reproduction and the right of public performance,
will be held liable if such acts were done without proper authorization
and unless a specific exemption, such as fair use, applies.2 0 1 The
particular case of service providers requires an additional explanation.
The adoption of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
included a Title II dealing specifically with the liability of service
providers in the online environment. 202 The liability of service providers
was limited for acting as a "mere conduit," for system caching, for storing
infringing material at direction of a user-hosting-and for linking or
referring users to infringing material. 203 This limitation applies against
the service providers but not against the users, subscribers, or account
holders. 20 4 To qualify as a service provider under the DMCA, the
company seeking to benefit from the exemption from liability must offer
transmission, routing, or provision of connections for digital online
communications between or among points specified by a user, of a

200.

94th Congress, Report on Intellectual Propertyand the National hiformation

Infrastructure,at ww.uspto.gov/web/offiestcom/doipnii/ipnii.
201.
See Eric J. Schwartz, United States, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LW &
PRACTICE, USA-125-162 (Melville Nimmer & Paul Geller eds., 1991).
202.
Digital Millennium CopyrightAct, Pub. L. No. 105-304.112 Stat. 2860 (1998).

203.

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (1994).

204.

17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(b).
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material of the user's choosing, and without modification to the content
of the material sent or received.20 5 The exemption also applies
to
20 6
organizations that provide online services or network access.
In exchange for the limitation of liability, service providers must
put in place a "notice and take down" procedure that includes the
designation of an agent and a procedure through which rightsholders
can notify such agent-the statute contains the details of the notification
content. 207 Under the Act, the person who allegedly made infringing
material available may counter notify. Basically, the Act specifies how
and within which delay the service provider must remove the infringing
material and under which conditions.
Without going into all the details of the DMCA, it can be said that
service providers that have no control over the content that goes through
their network or is posted on their servers and who are acting at arm's
length and in good faith are exempt from liability provided they comply
208
with the notice and take down procedure requirements.
The Act also limits the liability of non-profit educational institutions
for the infringing acts of faculty members or students, which could
otherwise be imputed to these institutions.2 0 9 The exemption applies
with respect to faculty members and graduate students and,
interestingly, in exchange for this limitation, educational institutions
must provide informational materials that accurately describe and
2 10
promote compliance with U.S. copyright laws.
In practice, the application of the DMCA seems relatively
straightforward. After having determined the identity of the service
provider concerned-using databases such as WHOIS-one browses the
database of the Copyright Office to locate the contact information that
service providers must make available. In practice, notifications are
normally sent to a mailbox specified by the service provider.2 1 It seems
that service providers are generally responding to the notices within
twenty-four hours and that they are also providing copyright owners
with an acknowledgment of receipt and a confirmation that the
infringing material has been taken down. There are a number of cases
in which a long lag-time has been observed between the notice and the
take down, which can cause significant commercial damage.2 12 In other
cases, the manner in which the service provider has taken down the
material was considered inappropriate, such as a simple freeze of the

205.
17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
206.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (e).
207.
Batur Oktay & Greg Wrenn, A Look Back at the Notice-Takedown Provisionsof
the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act One Year After Enactment, WIPO Doc.
OSP/LIA/2 (Dec. 1, 1999), available at www.wipo.int.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
17 U.S.C. § 512(e)(1)(C).
211.
Oktay & Wrenn, supra note 207, at 7-8.
212.
Id.
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infringing page or pages in such a way that the pages could be viewed
but not accessed. 213 But by and large the most important problem
reported by rightsholders has been the heavy administrative and
practical burden of policing the Web to find potentially infringing
material, locating the service provider concerned and its agent, and
2 14
proceeding with detailed notification required under the DMCA.

III. EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES
There are two "directives" in the European Union that will have a
direct impact on the conclusions reached in the study of the law of its
Member States, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Once finally adopted, all EU Member States will have a set timeframe
within which to conform their national legislation to the directives.
A. The Directive on Copyright in the Information Society
The main purpose of the Directiveon the Harmonisationof Certain
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society is to
implement the two 1996 WIPO Treaties.2 15 As regards the right of
communication to the public, the preamble to the directive states:
The Directive should harmonize further the authors' right of
communication to the public. This right should be understood in a broad
sense covering all communication to the public not present at the place
where the communication originates. This right should cover any such
transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by wire or wireless
2 16
means, including broadcasting.

The preamble later states:
The legal uncertainty regarding the nature and level of protection of acts
of on-demand transmission of copyright works and subject matter
protected by related rights over networks should be overcome by providing
for harmonized protection at community level. It should be made clear
that all rightsholders recognized by this Directive have an exclusive right
to make available to the public copyright works or any other subject
matter by way of interactive on-demand transmissions. Such interactive
on-demand transmissions are characterized by the fact that members of
the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen
2 17
by them.

213. Id.
214. Id.
215.
Directive 2001J291EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Directive
on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L167) 10.
216. Id. pmbl. 23.
217. Id. pmbl. 25.
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The Copyright Directive gives copyright owners an exclusive right
to authorize or prohibit any communication to the public of their works,
including the making available to the public in such a way that members
of the public may access the works from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them. 218 A similar right is granted to performers
in respect of fixations of their performances; phonogram producers for
their phonograms; film producers for the original and copies of their
films; and finally broadcasting organizations for fixations of their
broadcasts. 2 19 It seems that the right of making available as described
here covers all forms of transmissions of music online.
With respect to the right of reproduction, a right is granted to all
copyrighted works and a similar right granted to performers, phonogram
producers, film producers, and broadcasting organizations in respect of
the objects already mentioned above with respect to the right of
220
communication to the public.
The directive seems to imply that the right of distribution, which it
also recognizes, only applies to material objects. Paragraph 18 of the
Preamble states: "Copyright protection under this Directive includes the
exclusive right to control distribution of the work incorporated in a
tangible article... ,,221 and further, "the question of exhaustion does not
arise in the case of services and on-line services in particular. 222 In
other words, the first sale doctrine-here referred to as "exhaustion of
rights"-would not apply, which would seem to indicate that the
distribution right does not apply to online delivery of music.
B. The E-Commerce Directive and Applicable Law
Interestingly, the directive on copyright does not address the
question of transmissions between Member States or from third
countries. The Commission preferred to leave this question to the
Directiveon CertainLegal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal
Market.223
In this respect, this directive contains a number of
interesting features: (1) it does not aim to establish specific rules of
private international law relating to conflicts of law or jurisdiction; 22 4 (2)
"Information Society services"-including online music delivery-should
be supervised at the source of the activity in order to ensure an effective
protection of public interest objectives, and to effectively guarantee

218.

Id. art. 3(1).

219.

Id. art. 3(2).

220.

Id. art. 2.

221.

Id. pmbl.

28.

222.
Id. pmbl. 29.
223.
Directive 2000/311EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1-16.
224.
Id. pmbl. 7.

20011

TRANSMISSIONS OF MUSIC ON THE INTERNET

1405

freedom to provide the services in legal certainty for suppliers and
recipients of services, such Information Society services should only be
subject to the law of the Member State in which the service provider is
established; and (3) the rules determining where a service provider is
established are determined according to the case law of the European
Court of Justice.22 5 Usually, this is the place where the provider of the
Information Society service is the Member State where the provider has
its center of activities. 226 The eCommerce Directive does not apply to
service providers established in a third country, but the directive should
be consistent with applicable international rules and without prejudice
to the on-going discussions referred to as the Global Business Dialogue
launched on February 4, 1998.227
Based on the above, it seems that the European Union wished to
remain consistent with the position taken early on in the Directive on
Cable and Satellite Transmissions, in which it decided to apply the law
of the country of emission 228 or the law of the server-in most cases-as
in the Canadian Tariff 22 case. 229 In the Cable & Satellite Directive, the
European Union had dealt with transmissions from foreign countries in
the following way; if the broadcaster was located in a third country that
had a lower level of protection, but the uplink to the satellite was in a
Community Member State, then that Member State would be considered
the point of origin of the transmission.2 3 0 If the uplink and the
broadcaster were located in a third country, but "a broadcasting
organization established in a Member State had commissioned the act of
communication to the public by satellite," then the act was deemed to
have occurred in that Member State. 231 If similar principles were
applied to Internet transmissions and the server of origin of the
transmission was located in a country where copyright protection is
insufficient, but the transmission used a mirror or cache site located in a
Member State, then that could be considered the point or origin of the
transmission-and where a license would be sought. 23 2 If all serversexcept perhaps for the server managed by the ISP-were located outside
EU Member States, but the service was offered by or on behalf of a
company located in a Member State, then that could be considered the
233
point of origin of the transmission.

225.
Id. art. 22.
226.
Id. pmbl. 8.
227.
Id. pmbL 7.
228.
Council Directive 93183/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the Coordination of
Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to
Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Transmission, art. 2(b), 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15-21.
229.
See supra note 9.
230.
Cable and Satellite Directive, supra note 228, art. 1(2)(d).
231.
Id. art. 1(2)(b).
232.
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 538-39 (2000).
233.
See id.
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That will not be the case. Intellectual property, including copyright,
was carved out of the eCommerce Directive. 234 What is the impact of
this exclusion? Much will depend on the implementation of the directive
by the fifteen member States of the Union, and the twenty-seven other
European countries that have to adapt their legislation accordingly due
to their accession negotiations or other bilateral arrangements with the
European Union. It may be said, however, that because the country of
emission rule was specifically said not to apply to copyright, then the
reception theory applies. This would mean that a protected work or
object is made available in every country where it is downloadedprobably assuming, as in the French Yahoo! case, 235 that the provider is
able to filter out or at least categorize users based on their country of
origin. In theory, if a restricted act takes place in each country of
reception, a license for that country must be obtained. Because those
rights tend to be administered exclusively by copyright collectives"societies"-especially in the music field, a license would have to be
obtained from the society operating in each and every territory of
reception. And, because Internet sites are available worldwide,
interested users may be in more than two hundred countries. 2 36 This
could rapidly become an administrative nightmare. The provider would
theoretically have to report every use in the country of the serverwhere a reproduction and, arguably, a communication take place-and
in every country where a user downloaded or listened to a work-where,
arguably, a communication, a reproduction, and a distribution occurred.
Adding another layer of difficulty, because some legal systems may pick
the emission theory-as seems to be the direction in Canada and the
United States-and others the reception theory-as seems to be the case
in Europe-users would have to base their reporting on the-possibly
changing over time-legal system of each and every territory. Putting in
place a one-stop shop bringing together all collectives under a single
umbrella would make life easier, but may raise competition lawantitrust-concerns.
There is no easy answer but clearly a legislative interventioneither to clarify the situation or lift antitrust barriers-or a new
international set of rules may be desirable to avoid drowning copyright
law in a pool of impracticable requirements. Perhaps the new WTO
round of global trade talks, which may start as early as December 2001,
could include this topic in its revision of the TRIPS Agreement, which

234.
eCommerce Directive, supra note 223, art. 22(2).
235.
See supra note 77.
236. As of December 2000, there were music collectives in more than one hundred
countries, according to the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and
Composers (CISAC), at http://www.cisac.org (visited Oct. 4, 2001).
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will in any event include an attempt to incorporate the rules of the WCT
2 7
and WPPT into TRIPS.

IV. PUTrING IT ALL TOGETHER: ANALYSIS AND SCENARIOS
A. ComparativeAnalysis
Before looking at individual scenarios, it may be useful to
summarize the main similarities and differences among the six legal
systems under review, even though it may not be possible to convey all
appropriate nuances. The reader should turn to the appropriate section
of the Article for a more detailed analysis and reference materials.
1. The Right of Reproduction
A reproduction on the server from which users-"the public"-can
download music must be licensed in all six countries under review. In
both Canadian 238 and U.K.23 9 law, the format conversion-to upload the
work on the server-is also a reproduction requiring an authorization.
The same may be true under other national laws but the Author found
no confirmation.
The question whether the copy made by the end-user needs to be
licensed is more difficult to answer with certainty. Canadian law
contains a specific "fair dealing" exception for private use of recorded
use, but its application to downloaded music is not clear. 240 In France,
courts have considered that the fact that the user ends up with a "CDlike product" means that the copy is not "private."2 41 In Germany, the
end-user who listens to the music in streaming mode does not make a
copy that needs to be licensed. The situation is unclear when a
permanent copy of the work is made.3 In Japan, the end-user copy is
authorized by law, but compensation-probably in the form of a private
copying levy-must be paid.243 In the United Kingdom, again it is
unclear whether the end-user copy is fair dealing. If not, it would need
to be licensed. 24 4 In the United States, the end-user copy may be
considered fair use, although the rationale of the Audio Home Recording

237.
Declarations Made by Senior Representatives of the European Union and the
United States at the Fordham Eighth Annual Conference on International Intellectual
Property Law & Policy, New York (Apr. 27, 2000).
238.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
239.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
240.
See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
241.
See supranotes 51-57 and accompanying text.
242.
See supranotes 86-90 and accompanying text.
243.
See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
244.
See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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Act does not seem to apply directly to primary digital phonorecord
deliveries. 245 Finally, even when the first end-user copy is authorized,
any further use thereof would be governed by the reproduction right of
the country in which reproduction takes place and any exception thereto,
including fair use, fair dealing, and the civil law right of "private
6
copying."M
2 47
The EU Directive on Copyright in the Information Society
contains a reproduction right that would seem to apply to both servers
and end-users, although there are limited exceptions in favor of users.
2. Right of Public Performance/Communication/Transmission
The application of this exclusive right to the use of music in
streaming mode makes little doubt when the user does not select the
songs; this is comparable to broadcasting. Beyond that point, however,
the conclusions that can be drawn under each national law differ. In
Canada, posting a copyrighted work on a server-at least on a publiclyaccessible one-is a restricted act, even though the actual
communication-to the public-takes place only at the time of the user
request. 248 The Canadian Copyright Board has specifically rejected
arguments to the effect that no work was being transmitted based on the
transformation-for example, encoding-of the "work" during the
transmission. 249 In France, the right of "representation," which may be
considered a functional equivalent of the right of communication to the
public for our purposes, similarly applies to the posting of a work on a
website. 250 In Germany, the traditional right of "exploitation" already
contains a right concerning transmissions of works, which probably
applies to Internet transmissions. In Japan, the right of public
performance does not apply, but a right of transmission exists and
applies to both streaming and downloads, with slightly different legal
bases. 251 Under U.K. law, a public performance occurs if the user listens
in streaming mode. It is unclear whether the same can be said of pure
downloads. 252 In the United States, listening to music in streaming
mode is probably a public performance. There are solid arguments both
for and against the conclusion that a pure music download is also a
2 53
public performance.
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The EU Directive contains a new right of communication to the
public that includes a right to make available on the Internet-and other
interactive networks. 2 4
3. Liability Issues
The laws of Germany, Japan, and the United States already contain
specific provisions concerning the liability of service providers. Similar
provisions are about to enter into force in the European Union.2r 5 These
laws greatly limit the potential liability of service providers as
intermediaries, but impose different restrictions and conditions. In
Germany, under a 1997 law, a service provider may be liable if it is
"aware" of the use of its network for infringing purposes. 256 In Japan,
the service provider in most cases will not be liable, but it has a duty to
take "reasonable means" to deter the use of its servers for infringing
purposes. 25 7 In the United States, the DMCA 258 limits the liability of
service providers who act as mere conduits provided that: (1) a notice
and take down procedure is put in place; and (2) the provider has no
control over the content. A similar solution is provided for in the EU
Directive on Copyright in the Information Society.25 9 In other countries

under review, general legal principles apply. In Canada, the provider of
the network as such is not liable when he has no control over the
content. 260 By contrast, in France, service providers have a general
obligation of "diligence" because they can check the content posted on
their servers. 261 A good example is the injunction issued against Yahoo!
concerning the use of its servers for auctions of Nazi objects. 262 In the
United Kingdom, the rules that apply to cable operators would seem to
govern. Liability is only imposed if there is some degree of control over
2 63
the content.
4. Applicable Law
The rules in this area vary greatly and their commercial
significance is enormous. Each country would like to control both
servers located in its territory and users in its territory accessing
material posted on foreign servers. Copyright collectives similarly want
to be able to license transmissions from servers in their territory and
254.

See supra Part HI.
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See supra Part IH.
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users-including end-users-in their territory. 26 The latter may be
even truer of collectives based in countries in which there are probably
more users than servers.
The emerging legal picture is as follows. In Canada, servers located
in that country must be licensed independently of the user's location
because the communication-restricted act-occurs at the server's
location. The Copyright Board may, however, assert jurisdiction over
foreign servers whose primary market is Canada. 26 5 In France, the law
of the country "for which" protection is claimed applies. This could apply
to both servers, as several court cases have already shown, and endusers. 266 In Germany, consistent with rules dealing with satellite
transmissions, the law of the server governs, at least until the EU
Directive is fully implemented.2 67 In Japan and the United Kingdom, it
2 68
also seems that the location of the server is the determining factor.
U.S. law clearly applies to servers located in the country, which poses
interesting problems in terms of the extraterritorial application of
statutory licensing rates. 269 As they started to do in the iCraveTV
case, 270 U.S. rightsholders will no doubt want U.S courts to assert
jurisdiction over U.S. end-users and foreign servers that make content
available to U.S. users.
In the Directive on Copyright in the Information Society and the
Directive on eCommerce, 27 1 the European Union decided not to apply the
principle of the country of emission of the transmission that applies to
satellite transmissions and to apply to law of the country of reception.
The practical implementation of this principle in the fifteen EU Member
States-and the twenty-seven other European countries that are
obligated to adapt their laws accordingly under Accession Agreementshas not yet begun.
B. The Scenarios
ScenarioAl: American Records has its economic residence in Los
Angeles and operates a website from a U.S. server offering sound
recordings to the public over the Internet to listen to or downloadtogether with other features, such as biographies and tour dates-where
appropriate against credit card payment. Access to the site is not
restricted in any way.
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In this scenario, U.S. law clearly applies. Foreign laws may apply
in reception countries, as explained in Part IV.A.4. If the consumer
makes a permanent copy, the U.S. reproduction right applies. While
there is a doubt as to whether the consumer or American Records should
clear the reproduction, in practical terms a license should be obtained by
American Records either from the music publisher or from the Harry
Fox Agency. If the consumer does not listen during the download, there
is a doubt as to the application of the public performance right. A court,
however, would probably find that the digital phonorecord delivery,
constituting a digital audio transmission, is both a form of distribution
and a public performance in light of the amendments of 1995 and of the
DMCA to the U.S. Copyright Act. 272 The performing rights could be
cleared either directly with the U.S. rightsholders or with the
performing rights societies. In the case of foreign rightsholders, it may
not be possible to obtain those rights directly and recourse to a collecting
society might be more practical. If video is included, an authorization is
required from the rightsholder in the audiovisual work.
If lyrics and notations are added, while the rightsholder remains the
same, the need to secure the display right-usually from the publisherarises.
The business model chosen by American Records does not change
the nature of the rights that need to be cleared. It, however, may change
the basis for payment. On a pay-per-listen basis, the current tariff
structure for the mechanical reproduction right would seem to apply
each time a copy is made. If technology was used that allowed the user
to listen to the music a certain number of times without making
additional copies, it is questionable whether additional royalties would
have to be paid. On the performing rights side, both the ASCAP
Experimental License Agreement for Computer On-Line Services and
BMI website Music Performance Agreement calculate the fee on the
basis of the gross revenues generated by the website.27 3 The fact that
the content is only accessible on input of a password would not change
the legal nature of the transaction.
The fact that the service is interactive or quasi-interactive does not
change the nature of the legal relationship itself as regards the
underlying musical work. It may change the applicable tariff. There
are, however, significant differences regarding the to law applicable to
the sound recordings themselves. The producer's rights will vary
depending on the type of service. This is beyond the scope of this Article.

272.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304. 112 Stat. 2860, 2887
(Title IV amending § 108, § 112, § 114, chapter 7 and chapter 8. Title 17 U.S.C.) (1998).
273.
Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI) also offers a website music performance agreement
for corporate websites where the fee is based on either the number of page impressionsdefined as a transfer request for a single web page-or music impressions-defined as a
music page multiplied by the number of music file titles on that page. Sce http 'w,.
bmi.com/licensing/forms/corpimg0l.pdf, § 2(b).
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In the case of non-interactive services, the question arises whether
the cable compulsory license contained in the U.S. Copyright Act applies
to Internet retransmissions. Given that compulsory licenses are an
exception to exclusive rights and that the compulsory license refers
specifically to cable 274 -the expression "cable system" is defined in
section 111(f) as a facility that receives the signals transmitted or
programs broadcast by one or more television broadcast stations and
makes secondary transmission by wires, cables, microwave, or other
communication channels to subscribing members-the compulsory
license would not seem to apply to Internet transmissions. While one
could interpret "cable" as including Internet transmissions-because
Internet typically uses either television cable or telephone wires-this
expression was truly intended to refer to traditional cable. The House
Report on Title 17, for example, reads: "A typical system consists of a
central antenna which receives and amplifies television signals and a
network of cables through which the signals are transmitted to the
receiving sets of individual subscribers. ' 275 Thus, the cable retransmission statutory license does not apply to Internet-based 27re6
transmissions. The broadcast compulsory license applies, however.
In the United States, performing rights societies as well as the
Harry Fox Agency have acquired the necessary rights to license use of
music on the Internet-for the repertory that they administer. Where
use is made by a U.S. server and destined to U.S. consumers, these
licenses are available. Due to the consent decrees that govern the
operations of ASCAP and BMI, it is possible to obtain those rights
directly from the rightsholders, at least for those rightsholders that are
willing to grant those rights directly. Collective management of rights in
the United States is not mandatory. In fact, the Copyright Act is almost
silent on this point compared to certain European legislations, in
particular the German Law, which contain an entire statute on collective
rights management.
The question whether existing mandates given by authors to
publishers and by authors' publishers to societies cover on-line use is
interesting. Based on the recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Tasini,277 it seems that electronic rights may
need to be acquired by publishers separately and distinctly from paper
rights-although it could obviously be in the same contract- unless the
contract was clearly intended to cover all forms of exploitation in any
medium now known or later developed. While more recent agreements
were revised to include newer versions of the right, the performing
rights rightsholder agreements for older works only authorized ASCAP

274.
275.
276.
277.

17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1994).
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976) reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.A.N. 663.
See supra note 179.
New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 121 S. Ct. 2381 (2001).
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and BMI to license the traditional "public performance right."2 8 Yet, it
is the same right that today applies to some or all uses of music on-line
and this probably gives ASCAP and BMI the necessary authority to
license on-line uses. As regards author or publisher agreements, a
number of form agreements contain the words "and any and all other
rights that a composer now has or to which he may be entitled that he
hereafter could or might secure with respect to this composition," that
would arguably include newer forms of exploitation, particularly in light
of the fact that it is fairly traditional rights that apply to on-line musicthe right of public performance, the right of reproduction, and possibly
27 9
the right of distribution.
Because no new rights-in musical works-have been created in
U.S. law, but rather existing rights were extended or interpreted so as to
apply to new forms of use of music on-line, existing agreements would by
and large cover these new uses. This being said, it is certain that in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Tasinicase, a transfer of
copyright to a publisher may be interpreted restrictively if there were
any doubt that on-line rights were in fact covered.
ScenarioA2: Yankee Records operates a mirror site from a server
located in Paris.
The answer to this scenario would be the same as for Scenario Al
but for two additional comments. First, the reproduction taking place in
France would be governed by French Law and as such would require an
authorization from the local rightsholder. In addition, if French users
were targeted, then based on the principles ofthe Berne Convention and
of the French Law, SACEMISDRM, the French collective, would assert
the right to license transactions taking place with French consumers. It
is likely that a French court would come to the conclusion that use in
France did in fact occur and that such use had to be licensed.
The fact that the European Union seems to be favoring the
reception theory28 0 would mean that EU-including French-receptions
would also need to be licensed.
ScenarioBI: Osaka Records, with its economic residence in Kyoto,
operates a similar website from a server in Japan.
These transmissions should be licensed in Japan. According to
Japanese law, use occurs in Japan because: (1) a licensable reproduction
takes place there; and (2) that is where the transmission-protected by a
new exclusive right-takes place as well. Collectives or rightsholders in
the country of reception might nonetheless argue that a licensable
reproduction occurs in the country of reception-if different-and in
some countries they have a point. That would be impractical.

278.
See R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightand InternetMusic Transmisns: Exiting
Law, Major Controversies,PossibleSolutions, 55 MIAMI L. REV. 237, 245 (2001).
279.
See Susan H. Bodine et al., Counseling Clients in the EntertainmentIndustry

2001, 648 PLI/PAT 9, 79.
280. See supraPart M.
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Furthermore, it is better to find an arrangement that allows users of
authors' rights-whether content or service providers-to license
Internet transmissions only once. This is much easier in countries with
a single collective for both main rights. In Japan, the Author was not
able to determine whether the Japanese collective JASRAC currently
licenses music websites. It seems that they would need to acquire the
new right of transmission established in 1997. It is similarly unclear
whether foreign collectives acquire this right and can license it to
JASRAC in respect of their repertory.
Scenario B2: Osaka Records operates a mirror site from a server
based in the United States.
It was concluded that U.S. transmissions would be licensed in the
United States and U.S. collectives have indicated their intention to do
so; if the transmission's recipient was located in a third country, there
may be a need to license the reproduction in that country. Yet, because
it is eminently impractical to ask end-users to license mechanical
reproductions-but not to pay the levy on blank media where it exists, as
in Canada-the reproduction right should be cleared in the country of
origin.
The question is therefore whether the mirror site is the server for
purposes of an Internet transmission. The answer is yes. First of all, a
copy on a mirror site has a sufficient degree of permanence. It needs to
be authorized. It is not a mere ancillary technical reproduction
occurring as a result of the transmission. Second, users usually are
asked to choose the site nearer to them and would thus know they are
using the mirror site. If this view is correct, server location and "mirrorsiting" might become a tool in reducing the copyright price of commercial
28 1
music transmissions.
Scenario Cl: Marble Arch Records, with its economic residence in
London, operates a similar site from a server in London.
Again, the two main rights are involved and need to be licensed.
Because the server is located in London, U.K. law dictates that
transmissions occur in the United Kingdom. As already mentioned,
there is still an argument in the country of reception-if different-that
a separate reproduction occurs there, which also needs to be licensed.
ScenarioC2: Piccadilly Records operates a mirror site from a server
based in Japan.
Japanese law would apply and consider these transmissions
Japanese. If residence of the entity, however, not the location of the
server, should be the determining factor, that conclusion would change;
the server location argument is stronger in light of traditional copyright
law, but no decision has been rendered to confirm such a view.
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As mentioned above, a practical agreement with all or some of the
collectives involved should aim to have all transmissions licensed only
once, leaving up to collectives to split and redistribute revenues.
Currently, technological barriers may prevent this from happening
efficiently.
Scenario D1: Hexagon Records, with its economic residence in
Paris, operates a similar site from a French server.
The rights of reproduction and representation apply;
SACEM/SDRM apparently assert the right to license both. As already
mentioned, there is still an argument in the country of reception-if
different-that a separate reproduction occurs there, which also needs to
be licensed.
ScenarioD2: Hexagon Records operates a mirror site from a server
based in Pirateland-or another copyright haven.
Based on response to Scenario B2, the logical answer would be that
this transaction should be licensed only in Pirateland. This of course is
the weak point of any answer based on the country of the server-which
is the practice for satellite transmissions. In implementing the principle
that transmissions ought to be licensed in the country of the server, a
revised version of the so-called Bogsch theory should apply. According to
this proposal, a transmission would only be considered to have been
licensed in the country of reception if duly licensed in the country of
emission-server-which implies that the law-and practice-of the
country of emission is in line with accepted international standardssuch as the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention. 282 It would be
possible to implement the European directives on copyright and ecommerce in this way.283
Scenario E: Any of the above operate websites that are accessible
only to customers in specified territories; and where the server hosting
on such website may be located either: (1) in the country of economic
residence of the producer; or (2) in the country of the final consumer; or
(3) in a third country.
Making websites accessible only in certain countries certainly would
allay the concerns of rightsholders who still insist on splitting the world
into sales territories. Arrangements with subpublishers and distributors
are at stake. If the website is only accessible in the country where the
transmission is licensed, this removes any argument that the end-user
copy needs to be licensed in a different country-presumably by a
different collective. This restricted access scenario vill no doubt be
appealing, at least for a while, because it mirrors existing distribution
patterns. The iCraveTV284 case was a clear example of this, with the

282.
See supranote 222; see also Commission WVelcomesAdoption of the Directiveon
Copyright in the Information Society by the council, available at httpJ/europa.eu.int/
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added insult-for non-Canadian rightsholders-of having a questionable
compulsory license rate forced upon non-Canadian rightsholders.
V. CONCLUSION

The analysis has shown that copyright has the potential to adapt to
music transmissions on the Internet in the six major markets under
review. The solutions chosen vary considerably, however. The
reproduction of musical works on a web server for commercial
dissemination is a restricted act-an act requiring an authorization. In
most countries, the communication of that work to the public is also a
restricted act, albeit the legal basis used varies. While under U.S. law it
is arguably a public performance, especially when users listen to the
music as it is being downloaded, in other cases-Canada-a more
general right of communication to the public is involved. Japan is the
only country to have created a separate right of "transmission," and even
there more traditional copyright rights may apply. On a more political
level, one should bear in mind the fact that music rights are traditionally
managed by copyright collectives and in countries in which the rights of
reproduction and communication to the public or public performance are
managed by different organizations-as is the case in Canada and the
United States-each organization will try to maximize the scope of the
rights it administers.
What is clear, however, is that to implement the 1998 WCT, as the
United States did in the DMCA, the act of making the music available on
the Internet must be covered by at least one exclusive right. In the
scenarios in Part IV.B, the findings were applied to transnational
situations, as these are likely to give rise to the more complex and most
interesting legal challenges.
In the wake of the Napster case, 285 music transmissions on the
Internet seem unstoppable. The train is on the tracks. Rightsholders
may have the theoretical option of stopping every website in every
country or trying to impose release schedules country-by-country, but
this use of their exclusive rights may prove futile in the end. It may
make more sense to consider that the Internet is the best embodiment of
the change of the traditional exclusive right paradigm to a compensation
paradigm, in which rightsholders organize the market-to a certain
extent-with a view to ensuring proper financial returns. In other
words, if the only option of users is to infringe or not access music at all,
many of them will find a way to access the content they want. If, on the
other hand, content is accessible but in an organized, properly
channelled way, the "need" to infringe greatly diminishes and copyright
survives.
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